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TAILORED PARTICIPATION:
MODERNIZING THE APA
RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss*
ABSTRACT

Prominent scholars have criticized informal rulemaking's "Notice
and Comment" proceduresfor not providing adequatepublic input
into the process. The procedures can also be criticizedfor using a
one-size-fits all approachfor reviewing rulemaking, ignoring the
vast array of tasks agenciesface. This articleproposes a reform in
rulemaking procedures that will allow agencies to choose between
three models for overseeing proposed rules: peer review, Notice
and Comment, and deliberative democracy mechanisms. Such a
choice will allow agencies to tailor the form of oversight to the
goals they are trying to achieve. When focusing on the scientific or
technical validity of the information a rule is based on, agencies
should use peer review; to receive informationfrom the public, Notice and Comment; however, for controversial issues deliberative
mechanisms will provide the best opportunity to achieve consensus
or at least increase legitimacy and facilitate implementation, and
agencies should use them. This method should increase the effectiveness of the review, the accountability of agencies and the legitimacy of the rule, since it will match review to rulemaking. On the
other hand, it raises a classical "who guards the guardians" concern since it allows agencies to decide how their work will be reviewed. The article demonstrates that this concern is probably
overstatedbecause agencies already have other motivations to seek
accountability. Agencies already experiment with various mechanisms to increase their legitimacy, but the current system forces
them to use Notice and Comment regardlessof what else they have
done. This may allow special interests to twist the process in ways
that subvert the public good, or alternatively, lead administrators
to treat it as a meaningless proceduralhoop. The article also sug* Associate Professor, UC Hastings College of the Law. I would like to thank
Ashutosh Bhagwat, David Fontana, Ethan Leib, Alasdair Roberts, Reuel Schiller, and
Carolyn Shapiro for very useful comments on previous drafts. I would also like to
thank David Coolidge for language editing and Frederick Reiss for support and discussions. All errors are, of course, my own.
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gests guidelinesfor judicial review that will appropriatelybalance
the need to prevent unsuitable review choices by agencies with the
need to allow agencies to experiment with different models of oversight and at time err in their choice.
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INTRODUCTION
No administratorin Washington turns to full-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining input from interestedparties. Notice-and-Comment rulemaking is to
public participationas Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions-a highly stylized processfor displaying in a formal way the
essence of something which in real life takes place in other venues.
To secure the genuine reality, ratherthan a formal show, of public
participation,a variety of techniques is available ....
2
Consider three rules.

1. E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992).
2. The sources for the information included here are searches conducted on http:II
www.regulations.gov, the government regulation portal. Obviously, there are an infinite number of rules that could be addressed here. My criterion for choosing was to
find a manageable number of examples that require different levels of expertise and
have different patterns of public participation.
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In 2007 the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) called for a public meeting to discuss whether to mandate
seatbelts on large school busses. 3 It also provided opportunity to comment, and a large number of comments were submitted on the topic
(over time, the number grew to more than one hundred). After the
meeting, which was described in the proposed rulemaking as a
"roundtable," NHTSA published its proposed rules for comments. 4
Not surprisingly, the question elicited strong responses from school
bus operators, school bus manufacturers, school boards, public interest
organizations, former NHTSA officials and other interested people.
Comments addressed with passion issues of child safety, school financing, discipline, and other issues; the submissions included both
short and pithy responses and long, detailed, very technical
5
comments.
Contrast this with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) 2007 proposal to amend the rules regulating working conditions in shipyards, addressing, among other things, sanitation
requirements. While many comments appeared in response, industry
members or associations submitted all but two of the comments. 6 The
3. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards for School Bus Passenger Protection,
72 Fed. Reg. 30,739 (June 4, 2007).
4. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; School Bus Passenger Seating and
Crash Protection, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,509 (Nov. 21, 2007) (to be codified in 49 C.F.R.
part 571).
5. To give a couple of examples, taken from the shorter comments: "SAFETY
FIRST PLEASE: Please consider the safety of the children first and require that ALL
school buses be required to have and use seat belts, not just the new buses, but also
that the old buses be required to have seat belts installed (retrofitted). Parents are
required to have and use seat belts/car seats/booster seats in passenger vehicles, why
is there a different standard for buses? I have read some of the arguments against, but
I believe that the safety of our children should be our primary concern. (The requirement of aides on all buses for special needs children would also improve safety.)
Thank you." Public Comment of Kristy Durkovic, available at http://www.regula
tions.gov (No. NHTSA-2007-0014-0094) (Mar. 3, 2008); "1 am a school bus operator
in Harrison County, commenting that if the bus is impacted from the side, the students
will not get out fast enough trying to get out of their seat belts. Besides, the elementary students, as well as the upper grades, will use the buckles and etc. as weapons to
hit and injure others beside and around them in the seat. Here's another thing to
suspend students for! I firmly believe that this proposal is a BIG mistake!!! And the
proposal of making seat backs from 20 to 24 inches high has its drawbacks too. You
will not be able to see the smaller students and be able to tell what they are doing,
even when they are sitting up! This leaves the door open for a lot of things to imagine. I firmly believe this proposal is also a BIG mistake!!! PLEASE, DON'T GO
THROUGH WITH THESE PROPOSALS !!!!!" Public Comment, available at http:I/
www.regulations.gov (No. NHTSA-2007-28103-0076) (Dec. 11, 2007).
6. Public Comments, available at http://www.regulations.gov (No. OSHA-S0492006) (last visited Sep. 21, 2009).
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remaining two were submitted by the Navy and the National Institute
7
for Occupational Safety and Health, both government agencies.
While industry had strong views on the issue, few others seemed to.
However, in response to commentators' request, the agency scheduled
a public hearing.
Finally, in 2008, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
adopted a rule addressing the airworthiness of a certain helicopter, to
address a problem resulting from the failure of a fuel valve. While the
agency held a Notice and Comment period, no comments were
submitted. 8
These three cases show the large variety of issues that must be
addressed by the federal administrative state. The examples were chosen in an attempt to demonstrate the varying levels of expertise, different levels of public interest, and types of responses that typify the
government regulatory process. Such wide variety calls for equivalent
variety in models of oversight. Mechanisms which are quite appropriate for one type of regulatory issue can be inappropriate and counterproductive for other types. Officially many of these rulemakings are
handled under the Notice and Comment rulemaking procedures included in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), whose core is providing opportunity for the public to submit written comments. 9 Apart
from the criticisms that can be raised against the Notice and Comment
procedures themselves, there is the broader issue that applying a uniform approach to the extremely diverse set of issues addressed by
agencies is inherently problematic. Agencies are aware of that and do
not actually take a uniform approach in practice. Nonetheless, the legal framework of the APA forces them to jump through certain hoops,
and in this writer's view that needs to be changed. Agencies should
be allowed to dispense with Notice and Comment proceedings where
appropriate, though never at the expense of transparency or review.
They should, in fact, be strongly encouraged and even required to go
beyond Notice and Comment where appropriate. Instead of a "one7. Public Comment of Paul A. Schulte, NIOSH, available at http://www.regula
tions.gov (No. OSHA-S049-2006-0675-0129) (Mar. 19, 2008); Public Comment of
John H. James, Jr., Dept. of the Navy, available at http://www.regulations.gov (No.
OSHA-S049-2006-0675-0132) (Mar. 17, 2008).
8. The helicopter in question was the Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC)
Model 222, 222B, 222U, 230 and 430, and the regulations at issue required rewiring
and testing of the fuel valve. Airworthiness Directives: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 230 Helicopters, 73 Fed. Reg. 39,569 (proposed July 10, 2008)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R pt. 39). Estimates suggest that the FAA issues several
airworthiness directives each day. CINDY SKRZYCKI, THE REGULATORS: ANONYMOUS
POWER BROKERS IN AMERICAN POLMcs 31 (2003).

9. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
HeinOnline -- 12 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 324 2008-2009

2009]

TAILORED PARTICIPATION

size-fits-all" process for making rules, a more flexible approach
should be adopted that focuses on what is really important: providing
meaningful review of agency rulemaking that minimizes abuses and
problems, while allowing agencies, within the limits of such review, to
do their job.
Furthermore, the rules governing federal rulemaking process
have been criticized by many scholars. Most criticisms focus on the
ossification of the process and the degree to which it has become cumbersome and inefficient. 10 This article suggests a reform that goes
beyond mere streamlining of existing practices, and instead calls into
question the efficacy of the Notice and Comment process itself as a
means of legitimizing the administrative state. The article suggests
that Notice and Comment does not, in many cases, produce meaningful review, that is, review appropriate to the action. Notice and Comment may even decrease accountability in some cases.
To correct the problem, the proposed reform would allow agencies to choose (within limits) among several models of oversight and
to be assessed based on the mode of oversight used, which, hopefully,
would be the mode that best fits the procedure in question. The reform is pragmatic in two senses. First, it allows agencies to adapt the
form of oversight to the function the agency is trying to fulfill. Second, it acknowledges that actions already taken by some agencies have
actually improved accountability and suggests giving agencies that
adopt extensive participation mechanisms room to experiment with
them, even going so far as to allow them to omit the usual Notice and
Comment process altogether in cases where Notice and Comment
would undermine other models of oversight.
Part I of the article describes the current Notice and Comment
rulemaking procedures required by the APA, including surrounding
10. See generally Elliott, supra note 1; JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST,
THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 147-56 (1990); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some
Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992);

Richard J. Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59
(1995); Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law without Making Rules, 1981
REG. 25 (1981); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment: Rulemaking Ossification-A Modest Pro-

posal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453 (1995). But see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb
Yackee, Is Federal Rulemaking "Ossified"? The Effects of Procedural Requirements
on the Agency Policymaking Process (Feb. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author); Cary Coglianese, EmpiricalAnalysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1125-31 (2002); William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited:

Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere With Agency Ability to
Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393
(2000); Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463 (1992);
Anne Joseph O'Connell, PoliticalCycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portraitof the
Modem Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV 889, 923, 931-32 (2008).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
HeinOnline -- 12 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 325 2008-2009

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12:321

legislation and judicial review provisions, and outlines some criticisms
of that system. Part II discusses how insights from recent literature on
participation can be applied to the existing rulemaking procedures.
The literature on deliberative democracy teaches us that deliberative
participation mechanisms, such as citizen juries and other methods,
offer new and promising avenues to handle certain problems agencies
face, and should be acknowledged as part of the regulatory arsenal;
they are not hypothetical or utopian ideas, but methods that have been
tried at different levels of government in the United States and worldwide. From the literature on pragmatic participation we learn that deliberative mechanisms are not always necessary or appropriate, but
also that Notice and Comment is not always necessary or appropriate.
Part III then opens with two current proposals for reforming the APA
and explains why they do not go far enough; it then describes the
proposed reform. Three models of oversight are examined: peer review, Notice and Comment, and deliberative mechanisms. The
agency should choose between the models based on the enabling legislation and the scope of the anticipated conflict. This section then
discusses the characteristics of each model and how it should be evaluated, and addresses how the courts should review agencies' choices
of oversight model, suggesting a pragmatic, flexible approach that balances the need to allow room to experiment with the need to hold
agencies accountable. This part ends by reemphasizing the advantages of the suggested reform for the system, focusing especially on
the flexibility it offers and its potential to increase legitimacy. Part IV
addresses possible criticisms and responds to them, focusing especially on the danger of agencies abusing the system and the complexity of the proposal.
I.
NOTICE AND COMMENT RULEMAKING

The basic framework for informal rulemaking specified in section 553 of the APA is quite straightforward.I On rules made through
11. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). This section focuses on informal rulemaking, also
known as "Notice and Comment rulemaking," though that is not the only option available to agencies. Agencies can make policy decisions through adjudications, although
at least since the 1960s, many have used rules to make such decisions. See CORNEM. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND
MAKE POLICY 13-22 (3d ed. 2003); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise:Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1139,
LIUS

1147-48 (2001). Agencies can also use formal rulemaking procedures, although such
use is rare. O'Connell, supra note 10, at 901. Agencies also have the option of using
direct final rules, which are rules published in the federal register and which become
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
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informal rulemaking (also known as Notice and Comment procedures), the agency is required to publish a notice in the Federal Register, 12 provide an opportunity to submit written comments, consider
those comments, and then publish the rule with a "concise general
3
statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose."'
Court decisions, executive orders, and legislation by Congress
added requirements to this skeletal framework. Congress included ad4
ditional requirements in the organic statutes of certain agencies.' It
also passed a number of laws requiring agencies to prepare in-depth
analysis of regulations to protect various values-an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) that requires agencies to describe the impact
of their actions on the environment under the National Environmental
Protection Act (NEPA),' 5 an analysis of the rule's effect on small business under the Regulatory Flexibility Act,16 and others. Various presidents added requirements through executive orders, most notably the
requirement of publishing proposed and final rules in the annual
17
agenda and the regulatory review process.
effective if no opposing comments appear within a specified period of time after publication. Id. at 903 & nn.36-38. Finally, agencies may adopt interim final rules,
which first take effect and later receive comments. Id. On whether such rules are
legal under the APA, see generally Ronald Levine, Direct FinalRulemaking, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1(1995); Ronald Levine, More on Direct Final Rulemaking: Streamlining, Not Corner-Cutting,51 ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (1999) (saying direct rulemaking
is consistent with the APA). But see Noah Lars, Doubts About Direct FinalRulemaking 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 401 (1999) (expressing concerns about its use).
12. Notice on the agency's internet site or elsewhere is not enough. JEFFREY S.
LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 277, n.12 (4th ed. 2006).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). Formal rulemaking, of course, requires a much more
elaborate process, with formal hearings on the record and trial-like proceedings like
cross examinations. Id. at §§ 556-57. However, that process is exceedingly rare.
14. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (2006) (adding requirements about
hearings and docket keeping); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601
(2006) (adding requirements for an oral hearing and cross examination); Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (2006) (requiring an
oral hearing and advanced notice).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2000).

16. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (2006).
17. Agencies now have to publish proposed rules as part of the regulatory agenda,
which is published twice annually. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). They also have to send major rules, such as,
significant regulatory actions as defined in Executive Order 12,866, and regulations
with an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more, with a cost-benefit
analysis to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). Id. For a discussion of the regulatory review of
rules, see generally Joseph Cooper & William F. West, PresidentialPower and Republican Government: The Theory and Practice of OMB Review of Agency Rules, 50
J. POL. 864 (1988); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); John D. Graham et al.,
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Courts too added depth and layers to the initial requirements of
the APA. Agencies making rules have to make sure that the final rule
they end up with is a "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule they
started with, or else the case will be remanded to the agency with
instructions to reopen the comment period.' 8 The agency must also
include the relevant data on which it relied.' 9
Another major tool judges use to oversee rules is the "concise
and general statement" requirement. 20 The statement needs to address
the major issues related to the rulemaking. Courts require that an
agency "examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action. '21 The court will remand a rule for reconsideration under certain circumstances:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise.

22

This review is referred to as the "hard look" doctrine, in which courts
give agency actions close scrutiny, a "hard look." 23 By contrast,
Managing the RegulatoryState: The Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 953 (2006); Angel Manuel Moreno, PresidentialCoordinationof the
Independent Regulatory Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461 (1994); Alan B. Morrisson, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1985); Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of
Accountability and PoliticalReview of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059 (2001); William F. West, The Institutionalizationof Regulatory Review: OrganizationalStability
and Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRES. STUD. Q. 76 (2005). President
Obama's White House is currently engaged in amending Executive Order 12,866, but
it is not clear what the result will be. See General Services Administration, Federal
Regulatory Review, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/fedReg
Review.jsp (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
18. Chocolate Mfrs. Ass'n of United States v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1104 (4th Cir.
1985).
19. Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
20. LUBBERS, supra note 12, 376-77.
21. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
30, 43 (1983).
22. Id.
23. Judge Harold Leventhal of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit first used the term "hard look." Harold Leventhal, Environmental
Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV, 509, 511 (1974). He,
however, used it to refer to the care with which the agency has examined the issues.
Id. Today, "hard look" often refers to the court's behavior in giving an agency's final
decision a "hard look." See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 10, at 398-99; Pierce, supra note
10, at 69; Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
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agency interpretation of laws generally receives a high level of

deference.
A problem noted by several authors 24 is that this standard does
not allow agencies to know in advance which issues courts will consider important enough to require responses by the agencies. There-

fore, agencies acting in the face of uncertainty-and concerned about
being forced to redo years of work-will address any issue raised by
commentators, whether important or trivial. This not only makes the
rulemaking process more cumbersome, it gives regulatees-especially
the more sophisticated of them-a way to slow down or even halt the
rulemaking process when it suits their purposes. 25 The additional demands placed on agencies by courts make rulemaking complex and
cumbersome and have led scholars to criticize the ossification 26 of the
7
rulemaking process and to suggest solutions.2
Another concern raised by scholars is that many of the judicial
decisions restricting agency discretion exhibit a misunderstanding of
the reality surrounding agencies and how they regulate. 28 Since
judges are not experts-and given the variety of subject matters in the
administrative state, no judge can ever be an expert in everythingResponse to ProfessorSeidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 527 (1997); Michael J. Legg,
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC-Telecommunications Access Pricing and
Regulator Accountability through Administrative Law and Takings Jurisprudence,56
FED. COMM. L.J. 563, 563 (2004).
24. Pierce, supra note 10, at 69; McGarity, supra note 23, at 538-39; Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 492 (1997).
25. McGarity, supra note 23, at 533-35. That is not to say that regulatees do not
often have legitimate interests at stake, such as minimizing the cost to themselves and
preventing extremist regulation. Rather, the process is still prone to abuse.
26. A term that Professor McGarity uses in his famous article about ossification of
rulemaking, attributed to Donald Elliott. See McGarity, supra note 10, at 1385.
27. See generally Elliott, supra note 1; McGarity, supra note 10; Pierce, supra note
10; Verkuil, supra note 10; Seidenfeld, supra note 17. Recent empirical scholarship
found no ossification. See Webb Yackee, supra note 10; Jordan, supra note 10;
O'Connell, supra note 10, at 923, 932. However, all these studies acknowledge that
Notice and Comment rulemaking places substantial costs on the agencies; it is not
ossified, in their view, because agencies still make rules, often a lot of rules, in spite
of these costs. O'Connell's study also points out that agencies have been making
more and more interim or direct rules, rules where the rule is made first and the
comments collected later, demonstrating the burden the "comments first" requirement
puts on agencies. See O'Connell, supra note 10, at 923, 932.
28. McGarity, supra note 23, at 536-37; JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JusTICE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM AN INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE 4, 7 (1983); Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Story of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 334, 335-36, 379-80 (PETER L. STRAUSS
ed., 2006) [hereinafter The Story of State Farm].
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they may not be sensitive to the uncertainties and problems involved
in crafting a certain rule and may place unreasonable demands on
agencies or make decisions which are at odds with the reality of the
29

field.

Finally, a possible criticism is that the existing process does not
allow for meaningful participation or accountability through participation. I now turn to this topic.
II.
PARTICIPATION STUDIES AND THE

A.

APA

ParticipationCritiques of Notice and Comment Procedures

As mentioned above, the Notice and Comment process has been
criticized for not providing appropriate participation. Participation refers to the opportunity given to those who will be affected by the rule
to influence its wording, scope, and impact. "Those affected" can be
defined broadly (i.e., the public in general) or narrowly (i.e., direct
stakeholders or interest groups). This means participation usually involves allowing actors' input into the decision making process. 30 The
identity of the particular actors who will have input varies according
to the decision in question and the problem being addressed. 31 This
article takes an instrumental approach, focusing on the effect of participation on the policy that is being made and on participation's potential to improve agency decisions or implementation, but not on
participation's salutary effect on those participating. 32 In this, the article follows in Archon Fung's footsteps in assuming participation is
used to address deficiencies in decision making by officials. 33 It is a
29. Mashaw, The Story of State Farm, supra note 28, at 334, 335-36, 379-80;
McGarity, supra note 23, at 536-37.
30.

JAMES

L.

CREIGHTON, THE PUBLIC PARTICIPATION HANDBOOK: MAKING BET-

7 (2005) (stating that "[p]ublic participation is the process by which public concerns, needs and values are incorporated
into governmental ...decision making").
TER DECISIONS THROUGH CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT

31. Archon Fung, Varieties of Participationin Complex Government, 66 PAR 66,

66 (2006).
32. For examples of literature focusing on the effects of participation on the participants, see JOHN GASTIL, BY POPULAR DEMAND: REVITALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

THROUGH

DELIBERATIVE

ELECTIONS,

129-136 (2000) (arguing that

deliberative participation, through convening citizen juries, will lead to better informed and more engaged citizens, as well as less cynicism), and Maria Powell &
Lee Kleinman, Building Citizen Capacities for Participation in Nanotechnology Decision-Making: The Democratic Virtues of the Consensus Conference
Model, 17 PUB. UNDERSTANDING OF Sci. 329 (2008) (looking at the effect of participating in consensus conflicts on citizens and concluding that they substantially improve citizens' views of their ability to participate in such decisions).
33. Fung, supra note 31, at 67.
Daniel
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tool to increase the accountability of officials and to prevent abuses or
shortcomings.
Generally, enabling participation is one of the goals behind many
changes in government and political theory in recent decades; public
participation is considered an important positive value in modern democracies. 34 Since the 1960s, both judicial decisions and legislation
were intended to increase the ability of interest groups to take part in
the process and thereby to influence rulemaking. 35 However, as many
scholars have pointed out, experimentation with public participation
over the last decades raises strong concerns as to whether Notice and
Comment rulemaking actually achieves effective public participation
in many cases. Two concerns are especially important. First, it is
unclear that the Notice and Comment procedures actually allow the
public or stakeholders meaningful input into the process in most cases.
Second, and just as important, direct public input is neither necessary
nor appropriate in every rulemaking.
Starting with the more familiar first criticism, if the topic at hand
is one where public comment is appropriate and useful, several studies
suggest that the Notice and Comment process does not make for
meaningful participation. 36 Donald Elliott, quoted at the opening of
34.

ROBERT

A.

DAHL,

A

PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY: HOW DOES POPULAR

SOVEREIGNTY FUNCTION IN AMERICA?

3 (1963) ("democratic theory is concerned with

processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over

leaders"); CHRISTOPHER HOOD, THE ART OF THE STATE 121 (1989) (discussing how
egalitarian government leads to increased participation); B. Guy PETERS, THE FUTURE
OF GOVERNING

50-76 (2d ed. 2001);

ETHAN LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN

AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 1-4, 77-79 (2004)

(suggesting the need to create a method for deliberative participation of citizens in
government); Roger C. Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public
Participationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 527-30 (1972).
35. Gellhorn Ernest, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE
L.J. 359, 361-369 (1972); Frank Fischer, Citizen Participationand the Democratization of Policy Expertise: From Theoretical Inquiry to PracticalCases, 26 POL'Y ScI.
165, 165-66 (1993). Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), Recommendation No. 76-1, Public Participation in Administrative Hearings § 1. For a
more critical discussion flagging some of the problems of public participation, see
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV

1667, 1770-81 (1975),

MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDI-

49-54 (1988); Jim Rossi, Participation Run
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participationfor DeliberativeAgency Decisionmaking, 92
Nw. U. L. REV 173, 217-41 (1997).
36. An important question is what exactly "meaningful participation" entails.
While there is no single answer, for purposes of this Article, "meaningful participation" refers to input that will be considered seriously and may have influence on the
public decision, at the agency's discretion. However, more than one scholar would
say that this level of participation is insufficient. Ned Crosby et al., Citizens Panels:
A New Approach to Citizen Participation, 46 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 170, 170 (1986);
CIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION
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this article, stated flatly that when an official wanted real participation,
the Notice and Comment procedures were not what they used. 37 Jody
Freeman found the Notice and Comment process too adversarial to
create real dialogue, since parties talk at each other rather than with
each other. 38 Other scholars expressed similar concerns. 39 Most empirical studies of rulemaking, as well as articles that draw on them,
demonstrate limited participation in rulemaking and rare participation
beyond involved interest groups (and especially business interest
groups), which would-and do-participate beyond the Notice and
Comment stage anyway. 40 While interest group participation is
enough in certain kinds of cases, in others, lack of public participation
can lead to implementation problems or loss of legitimacy later.
The same studies also cast doubt on whether agencies actually
change their views following such participation, and on whether new
communication technologies, such as the www.regulations.gov website, allow for greater participation. 4' Even Mariano-Florentino Cu6lJAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM 32-34 (1991) (focusing on legislators, but easily applicable here,

since it analyzes concerns about lack of equality in access and inability of people to
influence decision makers, which are not confined to legislators); Sherry R. Arnstein,
A Ladder of Citizen Participation,35 J. AM. PLAN. Assoc. 216, 217-18 (1969).
37. Elliott, supra note 1, at 1492.
38. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1997).
39. Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 319
(1989); Rossi, supra note 35, at 216.
40. Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (1987); Mariano-Florentino Cufilar,
Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.REv. 411, 476-80; Marissa Martino
Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose
Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 250-53 (1998); William
F. West, FormalProcedures, Informal Processes,Accountability, and Responsiveness
in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 66, 70-71 (2004); John M. De Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to
Theory at the Federal Communications Commission, 55 DuKE L.J. 969, 987-89
(2006); David Schlosberg et al., Democracy and E-Rulemaking: Web-Based Technologies, Participation,and the Potentialfor Deliberation, 4 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 37,
49-51 (2007). KERWIN, supra note 11, at 180-81; Cramton, supra note 34, at 529.
Kerwin, who conducted the most wide-ranging study, found that between fifty-five
and sixty-six percent of rules where notice was published generated public comment,
meaning that many do not generate such public commentary. KERWIN, supra note 11,
at 180-83. He did not explain who participates. Id. He did, however, note that the
total evidence suggests that participation is real and important to interest groups. Id.
41. See generally Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participationin Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DuKE L.J. 943, 949 (2006). But see Stephen M. Johnson, The
Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participationand Access to
Governmental Information Through the Internet 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 277, 279 (1998)
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lar, who demonstrated that there were substantial numbers of
comments from individuals in the three rulemakings he investigated in
depth, 42 demonstrated that the comments from individuals, as opposed
to those from interest groups, had very little influence (though he did
find that in two of the rulemakings the agencies substantially changed
their proposal). 43 Other empirical research showed that agencies
change rules in response to comment in some cases, though the studies
found substantial changes in less than fifty percent of the rules
researched. an
This does not necessarily imply that agencies are unresponsive; it
can mean that the preparatory work leading to the rule was sufficiently
in depth that there was no need for further changes. But what does
raise concerns about the willingness of agencies to change are the
findings by Marissa Martino Golden that most changes put in rules are
minor, 45 and the finding by William F. West that out of sixteen
changes made in the forty-two rules he studied, most changes were the
result of political processes, not comments; only in five cases did the
46
comments have direct impact.
Besides the fact that an agency might treat the Notice and Comment process as just one more administrative hurdle, another drawback is that it comes too late in the day. The point in the rulemaking
process in which Notice and Comment proceedings kick in is when an
agency has a detailed rule ready to go. At that point in the process, the
agency has already considered and evaluated the different alternatives,
has almost always gone through a lengthy internal vetting process, and
many critical decisions have been discussed and finalized. Typically,
(arguing that internet use will make a substantial difference to participation in the
rulemaking process).
42. Cutllar, supra note 40, at 442, 448, 456 (referring to the numbers for each of
his three case studies respectively). Though, as Coglianese states, most of them were
form letters. Coglianese, supra note 41, at 953-54.
43. Cu~llar, supra note 40, at 476-80. Cullar found that most comments by individuals lacked sophistication, and that sophistication of the comment was the single
most important factor in the effect it might have on the agency. Id. at 480.
44. Susan Webb Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY 103, 111 (2006); Golden, supra note 40, at 259-60 (noting that five out of
eleven rules had minimal to no change, only one rule had substantive change, and that
the agency "rarely altered the heart of the proposal"); West, supra note 40, at 66, 71
(noting that sixteen out of forty-two rules were amended "in a meaningful but not
fundamental" way).
45. Golden, supra note 40, at 262.
46. West, supra note 40, at 71. More empirical research of rulemaking would be
useful, as pointed out by Coglianese, supra note 10, at 1137.
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the agency will have also received input from stakeholders. 4 7 At least
to some degree, the agency is fairly wedded to its decision at that
point, and the impact of input can be expected to be less than it might
have been if provided earlier. 48 This does not mean the agency will
not change its position or will not be open to comments; but it has
invested in its decision and will be less open to input than it might
have been earlier. This late in the game it is difficult for the agency to
identify or consider alternatives besides those already considered.
An example is the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)
standards for regulating ozone that came under consideration in Whitman v. American Trucking Association.49 In that case the agency
started working in 1982, and although initially it had to be forced into
action by environmental groups, by the late-eighties/early-nineties it
was hard at work analyzing the data and creating reports. In 1996, it
issued its final staff paper of 285 pages, references and appendices,
covering almost 200 studies and analyzing their problems, concluding
that the standard should be a concentration in the atmosphere of between 0.07 and 0.09 parts per million (ppm). 50 By the time the EPA
arrived at that standard, it was set on the range, although still debating
51
about limits within that range.
Agencies, being sophisticated political actors, are aware of the
problem of late input and many of them try to fix it in various ways.
As will be described below, several agencies use advance notice procedures to allow early input, and most agencies regularly solicit informal input before the actual proposal. 52 However, agencies do not get
"credit" in the courts for using these early mechanisms; they do not
47. West, supra note 40, at 70 (stating that of forty-two rules he assessed, only six
did not have informal contact with interest groups before the notice was published).
48. See KERWIN, supra note 11, at 73-81 (discussing pre-notice stages). West reviewed forty-two proceedings, out of which thirty-eight tested a specifically defined
alternative. West, supra note 40, at 69. Among the other four, only one was a regulatory action. Id. The average time between starting research and a proposed rule was
4.3 years, or 5.3 if rules that needed to be renewed annually (routinely) were excluded, compared to 2.2 years from proposed to final rule, i.e., substantial action occurred before the proposed rule. Id.
49. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assns. Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
50. Craig N. Oren, Whitman v. Trucking Associations-The Ghost of Delegation

Revived... and Exorcised, in

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES,

supra note 28, at 6,

14-15.
51. Oren points out that the differences within the range were tremendous. Id. at
18-22. However, his description of the battle surrounding the standards showed that
the battling interest groups had widely divergent approaches that went beyond the
debates about the range. Id. Yet, the agency's position limited the battle to debate
about limits within the range they had identified. Id.
52. West, supra note 40, at 69-70.
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count as part of the review process (and might even count against the
agency as ex parte communications). Also, informal contacts arewith some reason-suspected by outsiders as strongly favoring well
connected industry members over others.
The conclusion is that in certain cases all Notice and Comment
procedures achieve is pro forma participation, 53 rather than providing
a way to give power or a real say to stakeholders or the public. 54 Even
if in some cases the goals are achieved informally, there are many
examples of rulemakings criticized for problems that sufficient participation could have corrected.
This calls into question the suitability of Notice and Comment as
a method of participation. From the agency's point of view, if the
agency gets into the habit of treating a central participation mechanism as something done purely for form, the result will be that meaningful participation will not occur, whether or not it would have been
useful or important in a particular case. From the public's point of
view, if the participation is perceived as pro forma, Notice and Comment aside from responding to comments at a level sufficient to prevent overturning the decision through judicial review, the process will
lose legitimacy. 55 Public participation experts-practitioners and
scholars-have repeatedly warned against conducting "fake" participation, since such participation harms legitimacy, making it more difficult to achieve real participation in the future. 56 In the words of one
such expert:
53. Though clearly not all cases, and in the cases where there is heavy participation,
the Notice and Comment system may be very important. However, in at least some of
those cases, where, as described above, participation is limited, other methods of ensuring participation may better achieve the agency goals than Notice and Comment
procedures. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
54. In a recent study, Susan Webb Yackee demonstrated that in the forty rules she
evaluated, agencies reacted to forty-nine percent of the top concerns of comments,
with the level of change affected by whether there was uniformity or controversy
between the commentators. Webb Yackee, supra note 44, at 117. That still means
that agencies do not constantly change their rules in response to comments.
55. A good question is "in whose eyes" legitimacy will be lost. At the very least,
those who try to participate regularly will be disillusioned; reaction beyond that will
depend on whether the public starts perceiving the agency as unresponsive or
captured.
56. CREIGHTON, supra note 30, at 40-41; Judith E. Innes & David E. Booher, Reframing Public Participation:Strategiesfor the 21st Century, 5 PLAN. THEORY &
PRAc. 419, 419-20 (2004); see Renee A. Irvin & John Stansbury, Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the Effort?, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 55, 59 (2004)

(warning that misled participants would grow increasingly dissatisfied); see also
CAROLYN J. LUKENSMEYER & LARs HASSELBLAD TORRES, PUBLIC DELIBERATION: A
MANAGER'S GUIDE TO CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT (2006), available at http://www.busi

nessofgovemment.org/pdfs/LukensmeyerReport.pdf.
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A bogus participatory process destroys the credibility of all future
attempts to provide genuine participation on other issues .... If the

agency has already made a decision, public participation is a sham.
Save public participation for times when the agency really57wants it,
needs it, and is willing to respond to the public's ideas.
Though the research shows clearly that participation is not pro
forma in all cases, 58 if the public perception is that an agency does not
take participation seriously, the damage is done.
However, Notice and Comment can be also criticized for its format, which, according to some, does not offer sufficient opportunity
for participation. For several decades, scholars who advocated deliberative democracy also supported strong citizen input, beyond just receiving public comment. Advocates strongly demanded that, in
appropriate cases, the public affected should have the final say on policy decisions affecting it. 59 What is "appropriate," however, is not
always clear from the literature. Deliberative democracy ideas do not
refer to conducting regular public hearings; as with Notice and Comment, the format of a public hearing is seen as suffering from a number of drawbacks: not allowing meaningful input, not creating a
dialogue, not seriously informing the public, and limiting participation.60 Deliberative democracy methods aim at engaging people who
would not normally participate, either the whole public or a representative sample, and at creating an informed dialogue. The goal of the
dialogue may vary from achieving consensus to developing policy options, according to the issue under consideration. 6 1 While many are
skeptical about the ideas of deliberative democracy, 62 methods of de57.

CREIGHTON, supra note 30, at 11, 41.
58. Scholars demonstrate convincingly that agencies take comments seriously in at
least certain cases. See, e.g., Curllar, supra note 40, at 498; Webb Yackee, supra

note 44, at 117-18; William F. West, Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging Literature, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 655, 661(2005).

59. Arnstein, supra note 36, at 216; Cramton, supra note 34, at 525; see Crosby et
al., supra note 36, at 171.
60. Innes & Booher, supra note 56, at 424-25. But see Brian Adams, Public Meetings and the Democratic Process, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 43, 43, 46-51 (2004)
(describing methods of public participation through public meetings of city councils).
61.

ARCHON FUNG, EMPOWERED

PARTICIPATION: REINVENTING

URBAN DEMOC-

RACY 110, 127, 226 (2006) [hereinafter EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION]; Archon Fung,
Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and
Policing, 29 POL. & Soc'Y 37, 87-88 (2001) [hereinafter Accountable Autonomy];
LEIB, supra note 34, at 35-45; Jennifer Nou, Regulating the Rulemakers: A Proposal

for Deliberative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 26 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 601, 619-20
(2008).
62. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 35, at 211-12; David Schlosberg et al., Democracy
and E-Rulemaking: Web-Based Technologies, Participation,and the Potentialfor Deliberation. 4 J. INFO. TECH. & POL. 37, 39, 50-51 (2007).
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liberative democracy have been tested in many areas, including
budgeting, policing, economic growth, science and technology, water
projects, and more. While these methods have had mixed results, it's
clear they are one of the tools agencies can and do use in policy making. The next sections will address when and how they can be used.
B.

Deliberative Mechanisms in Practice

The following section addresses the literature that describes use
of deliberative mechanisms, evaluates them, or suggests ways to use
and improve them. The focus is on past experiences. Addressing the
potential of deliberative mechanisms to perform in new and promising
ways or analyzing the theoretical foundations of deliberative mechanisms is beyond the scope of this article. 63 The goal of this paper is to
demonstrate that deliberative mechanisms are an extant alternative for
administrators, or at least something experimented with. This discussion does not purport to cover all currently or potentially conceived
possibilities; new combinations of methodologies are constantly being
invented.
Not all experiments with deliberative methods were successful,
certainly not if one defines success as achieving consensus or a specific result. Thomas Webler describes the example of a landfill siting
project where long discussions with citizens failed to lead to agreement on the siting, and points out that, while the official initiating the
process saw it as a failure, the citizens probably saw it as a success,

since they avoided having the landfill in their community. 64 Several
65
instances of regulatory negotiation have not achieved a consensus,
and scholars have rightly cast doubts on the effectiveness of the process and its ability to prevent litigation. 66 Notice and Comment
63. For discussion of the theory behind these mechanisms, see generally FISHKIN,
supra note 36, at 29-41, LEIB, supra note 34, at 31, and Nancy Roberts, Public Deliberation in an Age of Direct Citizen Participation,34 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 315,
322-30 (2004).
64. Thomas Webler, 'Right' Discourse in Citizen Participation:An Evaluative
Yardstick, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING

35-36 (Ortwin Renn et al. eds., 1995).
65. The EPA, the most active agency in using negotiation to issue rules, had completed eleven negotiations as of mid-1993. Of these eleven negotiations, the EPA was
able to reach a full consensus on seven cases and partial consensus on two. Daniel J.
Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Form of Public Participation,in FAIRNESS AND
MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 35,

COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL

DISCOURSE,

supra note 64, at 223, 227-28.

66. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promiseand Performance of Nego-

tiated Rulemaking, 46 DuKE L.J., 1255, 1286-1309 (1997). But see Philip J. Halter,
Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9
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processes occasionally end in rules that are criticized by participants, 6 7
and there are certainly rules that are litigated. 68 As is the case with all
forms of policy making, participatory methods should be used where
they are relevant to their goal, used carefully, and used with the
knowledge that there are no guarantees of success and that it is an
ongoing process. Although participatory methods will sometimes end
in deadlock and debate, that does not mean they should not be used. It
does mean they need to be corrected and improved on an ongoing
69
basis, and that they will need to be carefully structured and planned.
Inclusive methods, i.e., methods that encourage participation
from the population at large, have been used from a neighborhood
level to the level of a medium city for issues such as local budgeting
and determining growth, 70 policing, and schools. 7 1 For example, Chicago has engaged in two such experiments: neighborhood level school
management and neighborhood level policing. Citizens are very actively engaged in both activities, and, while success has not been universal, crime has dropped and school achievements have improved in
many neighborhoods. 72 Similarly, participatory budgeting was used
in the following places: cities in Brazil, starting with Porto Alegre and
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 32, 40-41 (2000) (claiming the process is "enormously successful in developing agreements in highly polarized situations.").
67. The studies of participants focused on the importance they see in the rulemaking process to achieving their goals. See, e.g., KERWIN, supra note 11, at 180-81;
Scott R. Furlong & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Interest Group Participationin Rule Making: A Decade of Change, 15 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 353, 360 (2005)

(describing the results of a survey that asked participants different questions as to the
importance of rulemaking to them).
68. See generally Jordan, supra note 10, at 412-39 (discussing the effect of court
decisions on agency rulemaking).
69. See generally Archon Fung, Deliberative Democracy, Chicago Style: Grassroots Governance in Policing and Public Education, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL

INNOVATIONS

IN

EMPOWERED

PARTICIPATORY

GOVERNANCE,111,

133-37 (Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright eds., 2003) [hereinafter Deliberative Democracy, Chicago Style] (providing two examples where problems that damaged deliberative mechanisms were fixed by external intervention); CREIGHTON, supra note

30, at 229-42 (providing studies of three public participation cases).
70. For deliberative democracy experiments with budgeting, see generally REBECCA
ABERS, INVENTING LOCAL DEMOCRACY: GRASSROOTS POLITICS IN BRAZIL, 71-89
(2000); Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Participation,Activism and Politics: The Porto Alegre
Experiment, in DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EmpowERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, supra note 69, at 45-76. For examples of using

deliberative democracy to decide on patterns of growth, see generally Edward C.
Weeks, The Practice of DeliberativeDemocracy: Results from Four Large-Scale Trials, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 360, 366-69 (2000).

71. For policing and schools, see generally FUNG, Accountable Autonomy, supra
note 61, at 73-75, and FUNG, EMPOWERED PARTICIPATION, supra note 71.

72. Fung, Deliberative Democracy, Chicago Style, supra note 69, at 111.
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moving to other cities; 73 Washington, D.C., where the budget under
Mayor Anthony Williams was planned and evaluated through a Citi-

zen Summit;74 Eugene, Oregon; and Sacramento, California. 75 Participation has never been completely general, but there are strong
indications that the process did increase legitimacy and involved people who would not otherwise be included.
More targeted methods, such as citizen juries, citizen panels,
planning cells, workshops, consensus groups, interactive meetings,
and others, were used on a larger scale, up to a large country level,
including the U.S. and Germany. Some European countries routinely
use representative models for handling issues of science and technology. 76 For example, Denmark has used consensus conferences, which
engage ten to twenty-five citizens in several rounds of deliberations

spread out over three months and end with a report making recommendations. As of 2005, this technique was used for twenty-two tech-

77
nology issues, including electronic surveillance and air pollution.
These conferences produce reports with recommendations, and frequently-though not always-the recommendations are adopted into
policy.78 In Germany, planning cells, where about twenty-five citi-

zens meet and deliberate on an issue for several days, have been used
for a number of issues, including a broad project (with twenty-four
73. ABERS, supra note 70 at 83-89; Baiocchi, supra note 70, at 41-76.
74. CAROLYN J. LUKENSMEYER et al., A Town Meeting for the Twenty-First Century, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE
Civic ENGAGEMENT IN THE 2 1ST CENTURY 154, 154-56 (John Gastil & Peter Levine
eds., 2005).
75. Weeks, supra note 70, at 363-66. The budget process worked well in Brazil.
See Baiocchi, supra note 70, at 69 (noting the success of the Participatory Budget
(PB) process); Weeks, supra note 70 at 365. I have no data on how it worked in
Washington (results are not mentioned in Lukensmeyer at all), but it worked only
moderately well in Sacramento. While important changes were suggested and the end
budget followed the result of the workshops, the participation rates were lower than in
the other places and the result less definite. Id. at 366.
76. Anneke Hamstra, The Role of Public Instruments of Constructive Technology

Assessment in Public Participationin Science, in

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SCIENCE:
THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS CONFERENCES IN EUROPE 53, 59-64 (Simon Joss and John

Durant eds., 1995); Lars Kluver, Consensus Conferences of the Danish Board of
Technology, in PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SCIENCE: THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS CONFERENCES IN EUROPE, supra note 76, at 41; Josfe van Eijndhoven, Technology Assessment: Product or Process? 54 TECH. FORECASTING & Soc. CHANGE 269, 269-70
(1997); Simon Joss, Public Participationin Science and Technology Policy and Decision-Making-Ephemeral Phenomenon or Lasting Change? 26 Sci. & PUB. POL'Y
290, 290-91 (1999).
77. Carolyn M. Hendriks, Consensus Conferences and Planning Cells: Lay Citizen
Deliberations, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE Civic ENGAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 74, at 83-84, 89.
78. Id.
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planning cells) that discussed energy policy, ended with a decision to
adopt a policy that emphasized conservation and energy efficiency
rather than high supply, and included a list of very specific
79
recommendations.
The United States experimented only once with a mechanism
called a "planning cell," in relation to sewage sludge management in
New Jersey. 80 However, a very similar mechanism-citizen jurieshas been used several times. Citizen juries are small groups (fifteen to
twenty-five individuals) selected randomly but according to criteria
that makes them demographically representative. They meet for a
number of days for an intense workshop in which they study an issue,
receive materials and hear from experts, after which they deliberate
and create recommendations. 8' So far, citizen juries have been used at
82
the national level to suggest options for dealing with climate change,
as a political legitimating exercise to deliberate on budgetary problems
and health care reform, 83 and in the contexts of global warming, edu84
cation, environmental protection, and managing water resources.
Additionally, United States national and state agencies8 5 have
used participatory mechanisms to make rules on issues that are governed by a central law but then have strong local aspects. For example, a broad-range participatory project was used to choose the site for

79. Id.; Peter C. Dienel & Ortwin Renn, Planning Cells: A Gate to 'Fractal' Mediation, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, supra note 64, at 117, 130-32.
80. Hendriks, supra note 77, at 93.
81. The term "citizen juries" has been registered as a trademark by the Jefferson
Center. See Nou, supra note 61 at 618 (referencing www.jefferson-center.org). Part
III discusses Nou's article in greater detail. There appears to be little difference between citizen juries and planning cells. Although planning cells in Europe tended to
be conducted serially, i.e., more than one planning cell about a topic was held at the
same time, some citizen juries were also conducted serially while others were not, and
on some topics only one citizen jury was held. Other than that, the two models seem
to do the same things. See, e.g., THEODORE LEWIS BECKER & CHRISTA DARYL SLATON, THE FUTURE OF TELEDEMOCRACY 53-54 (2000).
82. See JEFFERSON CENTER, CITIZENS JURY: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2002),
available at http://www.jefferson-center.org (follow "Past Projects" hyperlink).
83. Jefferson Center, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.jefferson-center.org
(follow "FAQ" hyperlink; then follow "How successful were Citizen Jury projects on
specific public policy issues?" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
84. John Randolph & Michael Bauer, Improving Environmental Decision-making
through Collaborative Methods, 16 REv. POL'Y RES. 168, 178-85 (1999); Irvin &
Stansbury, supra note 56, 61-63.
85. Agencies in other countries have also used participatory mechanisms in the
same manner; however, for the purpose of this paper, addressing the United States
agencies is enough.
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a dam in Arizona. 6 Such projects have also been used for addressing
87
waste management.
Similarly, stakeholders-centered participatory mechanisms have
been used in the United States. In the area of the Endangered Species
Act, Habitat Conservation Plans are a very controversial mechanism
that brings stakeholders together to deliberate, negotiate and create a
plan for implementation of the Act in relation to a specific species. 88
While regulatory negotiation 89 has not become as common as its promoters first hoped, 90 it has been used in a number of instances, often
ending in a proposed rule that then had to go through Notice and Comment. A 1995 study addressed eleven negotiations conducted by the
EPA, seven of which ended in a proposed rule and two of which ended in almost complete consensus. 9 1
If done properly, these methods can be expensive, though not
necessarily prohibitively so. The Jefferson Center estimates that citizen juries will cost $35,000-90,000,92 and a three year, broad participatory project about the Arizona dam location cost "approximately
$1 million (in 1980 dollars)." 93 That number addresses only what the
participation consultants charge; it does not take into account the
hourly costs for the agency to prepare the proposal (including possible
scientific surveys needed to assess alternatives) and arrive at a decision. On the other hand, this is a one-sided equation; we do not really
have empirical data on how much conducting a Notice and Comment
86. CREIGHTON, supra note 30, at 233-36.
87. See Anna Vari, Citizens' Advisory Committee as a Model for Public Participa-

tion: A Multiple-CriteriaEvaluation, in

FAIRNESS AND COMPETITION IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: EVALUATING MODELS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, supra note 64, at

103, 108-09.
88. See generally Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning: Certainly
Empowered, Somewhat Deliberative, Questionably Democratic, 29 POL. & SoC. 105
(2001); CHARLES SABEL ET AL., BEYOND BACKYARD ENVIRONMENTALISM 3-5 (2000).

89. Regulatory negotiation, often referred to as "reg-neg," is a process for increasing the level of participation in rulemaking. In regulatory negotiation, the agencyitself or through a moderator-organizes a negotiation between interested parties; if
the negotiation is successful, the result is a proposed rule which, then goes through the
Notice and Comment process. See Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation v. Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, Counterclaims and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599, 599-600 (2000).
90. See generally Fiorino, supra note 65, at 223-25.

91. Id. at 228.
92. Jefferson Center, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 83; see also Mark D.
Robbins, Bill Simonsen & Barry Feldman, Citizens and Resource Allocation: Improving Decision Making with Interactive Web-Based Citizen Participation,68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 564, 569 (2008) (suggesting that due to the costs of participation
mechanisms they should be reserved for controversial issues).
93. CREIGHTON, supra note 30, at 233.
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process costs. 94 The cost of the rulemaking process cannot stop at the
point where a rule is created-it must also address costs of implementation and costs of litigation, if any. One of the claims often made by
those supporting deliberative mechanisms is that these methods can
decrease costs of implementation and costs of possible litigation after
the fact.95 A decision which is impossible to implement cannot be
useful, and certainly does not represent an economy, no matter how
modest the cost of the decision-making process. Admittedly, this is a
somewhat theoretical discussion, given the lack of systematic data.
However, in one anecdotal example, Crosby describes a situation of a
dispute between Winona County in Minnesota and another city, where
the Jefferson Center offered to conduct a citizen's jury for $5,000;
after the city disapproved, considering the process too expensive, "the
two sides together had incurred legal fees of over $500,000.''96 This,
Crosby implies, is due to the contentious nature of the non-participatory method, which could have been mitigated by using a participatory method.
It is clear, however, that deliberative mechanisms require a high
level of involvement and time and concentration from the participants

94. To the best of my knowledge there is no empirical study of the costs of Notice
and Comment rulemaking; however, there is some information about how long a
rulemaking takes. See West, supra note 40, at 69 (finding on average that it took 4.3
years until notice and 2.2 years from notice to finalize a rule, with the average time till
notice rising to 5.3 years if one excludes routine renewal of rules that have to be
renewed annually); see also Webb Yackee, supra note 10, at 13-23. However, this
information just tells us about the time the total rulemaking takes. A true comparison
would have to include implementation and litigation costs, and as far as I know, this
data is not available. Studies measuring the costs of the regulatory state focus on the
costs of regulation for the private sector, not the costs of making and implementing
the regulations in the public sector. See CLYDE WAYNE JR. CREWS, COMPETITIVE
ENTERPRISE INST., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE
FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 1-3 (2008); WINSTON HARRINGTON, GRADING EsTIMATES OF THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATION I (Resources for the

Future) (2006), available at http://ssm.com/paper=937357 (addressing the number of
regulations and federal register pages, as well as the federal budget; but these measures do not allow a calculation of the costs of specific rulemaking processes).
95. See ROSEMARY O'LEARY, ROBERT F. DURANT, DANIEL J. FIORINO, & PAUL
WEILAND, MANAGING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL, ORGANI-

ZATIONAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES 133-36 (1999); CREIGHTON, supra note 30, at

18, 19. But see Coglianese, supra note 66, 1292-95, 1301-09 (noting that scholars
have cast doubt on the effectiveness of the rulemaking process and its ability to prevent litigation).
96. Ned Crosby, Citizen Juries: One Solution for Difficult Environmental Questions, in FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCE IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, supra note 64, at
157, 166.
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themselves. 97 While participants may receive substantial external and
internal benefits from the process, the need for that level of involvement suggests limits on the extent of use of these methods, and certainly limits on the number of projects any one actor may be involved
in.

98

The final observation is that there are difficulties in evaluating
the success of these programs. There is no one view on what constitutes effective participation or how to measure it. 99 Some programs
were seen by their participants and other actors as highly successful,
others were seen as failures and in other cases there was no consensus
on the level of success.
What is clear, however, is that the current form of participation in
rulemaking does not take into account what decades of experimenting
with deliberative methods can teach us. That should be corrected.
Deliberative democracy is a legitimate alternative to Notice and Comment in appropriate cases, and agencies should use it where appropriate. 1°° It is not a utopian or purely theoretical idea.
Agencies can, and do, as described above, use deliberative methods in addition to Notice and Comment, but that creates problems of
its own. Imagine a dispute about siting a nuclear plant. A long, complicated deliberative process arrived at a solution acceptable to all but
100 people using the area suggested for a medieval mock tournament.
The group submits a comment complaining that the agency did not
acknowledge the cultural import of its tournament. The agency does
not address it in its general statement, focusing instead on the deliberative process and the reasons for its final result. The group takes the
agency to court. The agency may or may not win, but it has some
cause for concern since it did not address the argument and the court
might see that as problematic. Leaving aside the time and energy the
agency has to spend on litigating this issue, the result in this case has
97. See Irvin & Stansbury, supra note 56, at 58; Fung, Deliberative Democracy,
Chicago Style, supra note 69, at 111.
98. External benefits include desirable policy outcomes, increased control over governmental processes, and stronger communities. Internal benefits (internal to the participating citizen) can include increased knowledge about public affairs, a sense of
empowerment, and stronger civic involvement.
99. Ortwin Renn et al., Public Participationin Decision Making: A Three-Step Procedure, 26 POL'Y ScI. 189, 190-191 (1993); see also Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer,
Evaluating Public-ParticipationExercises: A Research Agenda, 29 Sci., TECH. &
HUMAN VALuES

512 (2004); Webler, supra note 64, at 35-38.

100. The logic of deliberative democracy mechanisms is different than that of Notice
and Comment, and should therefore be evaluated using different criteria. As such,
deliberative democracy should be considered as an alternative as opposed to an "extra" form of review for which the agency can utilize.
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been achieved in a way that is not directly reliant on Notice and
Comment. 101
C. Pragmatic Participation
A second important strand in the current literature on participation offers a different set of insights. This literature, which has been
described as the "pragmatic participation" literature, 0 2 suggests that
the form of participation should be suited to the problem to be solved
and the goals to be achieved. 01 3 Not all problems can be solved by a
deliberative mechanism. Sometimes, allowing the public to participate is the best way to assure meaningful review and control of agencies' decisions. Sometimes, it is not. This section reviews what goals
participation can achieve, in order to suggest when a mechanism to
allow participation-whether Notice and Comment or deliberative-is
appropriate.
There are several goals towards which participation aims, and
there can be different goals in different situations.' i4 Again, it is vital
to make the distinction between the agency's point of view and the
public's point of view. From the agency's point of view, public participation can increase the quality of the agency's decision by introducing new information about available alternatives and/or about
public preferences. Participation can also improve decisions by providing an external check on the agency's processes. Agencies can
also use participation to facilitate implementation both by building
consensus and by the reduction of resistance that seems to occur as a
result of participatory processes. Agencies aim to legitimize and build
up the credibility of their policy decisions by setting up legitimate
processes and pointing to the legitimacy of such processes as a way of
building support for the final result. 10 5 Finally, agencies may wish to

101. Though this example is hypothetical, it is far from imaginary; it draws on the
example of the dredging of the Oakland port described by Robert Kagan, where an
acceptable compromise-though not one arrived at through a deliberative processwas taken first to federal and then to state court and undermined by the Half Moon

Bay Fisherman's marketing association.

ROBERT

KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:

25-29 (2001).
102. Archon Fung, Democratic Theory and PoliticalScience: A PragmaticMethod
of Constructive Engagement, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 443, 444 (2007).
103. Irvin & Stansbury, supra note 56, at 61, 62; see also CREIGHTON, supra note
30, at I1, 42-44; Fung, supra note 31, at 67.
104. CREIGHTON, supra note 30, at 11, 42-44; see also Fung, supra note 31, at 67.
105. Studies have shown that people may react to either the outcome or to the process of policy making, or both. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
161-165.
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
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provide information to the public about their activities or educate the
public.
From the public's point of view, the first goal of participation is
the basic goal of allowing people to have an influence on decisions
affecting their life. This raises several problems: often the people who
participate are not the general public, and it is unclear to what degree
decision making by those willing to get involved is better than decision making by the bureaucrats. 10 6 The bureaucracy's decision can
derive legitimacy either from expertise or from the fact that heads of
agencies are appointed by elected representatives. Another goal for
participation, from the public's point of view, is having increased control over government behavior and holding agencies to account, espe10 7
cially in the current age where distrust in government is strong.
Finally, the public may prefer efficient use of public resources, though
the relation between that goal and participation is complex. On one
hand, there is a tension between spending resources on participation
and spending resources on other activities, which are also important to
the public. On the other hand, as suggested above, resources spent on
participation may increase efficiency by identifying better alternatives
suggested by the participants, by facilitating implementation, and increasing legitimacy. In addition, participation can serve as a legitimating mechanism to compensate for the fact that agencies are not
directly elected. 10 8
The goals to be achieved will vary across agencies and across
rules, and across the stage in the process. After all, policy making
tends to be an ongoing process and a current rulemaking is often con106. See SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA:
DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 127, 150 (1987) (demonstrating that

POLITICAL

those who

participate are unrepresentative and skewed in specific ways). But see Archon Fung
& Erik Olin Wright, Thinking About Empowered ParticipatoryGovenance, in DEEPENING

DEMOCRACY:

INSTITUTIONAL

INNOVATIONS

IN EMPOWERED

PARTICIPATORY

supra note 69, at 3, 26-29 (providing examples of participation that
was more common among the less wealthy on issues that are very close to home for
them).
107. ROBERT A. KAGAN, The Organization of Administrative Justice System: the
Role of Political Mistrust (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see
also Seok-Eun Kim, The Role of Trust in the Modern Administrative State: An Integrative Model, 37 ADMIN. & Soc'Y 611 (2005).
108. Giandomenico Majone, The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems, 22
GOVERNANCE,

W. EURO. POL. 1, 2 (1999); see also GIANDOMENICO MAJONE, INDEPENDENCE VS.
ACCOUNTABILITY:
MENT IN EUROPE

NON-MAJORITARIAN

INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC

GOVERN-

1 (1994); Mark Thatcher, Delegation to Independent Regulatory
Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation, 25 W. EURO. POL. 125,
126 (2002); Mark Thatcher & Alec Stone Sweet, Theory and Practice of Delegation
to Non-MajoritarianInstitutions, 25 W. EURO. POL. 1, 2 (2002).
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nected to and influenced by previous agency actions. If agencies faced
substantial conflicts with stakeholders on similar issues, an agency
may want to prevent or reduce such conflict in the rulemaking. In that
situation, a deliberative mechanism may be the best choice. In others,
an agency will want to make sure it has considered all the relevant
information and ascertain what the public preferences are; in that situation, an opportunity for the public to submit comments may suffice.
If an agency is making a rule on an issue that is technically complex
and on which its experience leads it to believe that there will be little
or no controversy, or controversy only between the agency and the
regulated industry, it will probably not want to do much beyond informing the public. In such cases, there is a high probability that Notice and Comment will be a sham.
These are the kinds of areas in which large numbers of comments
are not likely to be submitted. 10 9 One reason for this is that the public
is not well informed on these issues. Agency members are aware of
that fact, and are unlikely to give much weight to public comments.
Their responses are often merely pro forma, intended mainly to preempt judicial review. 110 Participation by the public by no means guarantees meaningful accountability, and where public participation is
appropriate, the optimum form for it will not always be the same.
Furthermore, agencies may have different goals at different
points in the rulemaking process. An agency may want to separate the
process into an early stage of gathering scientific information (which
can be done at a preliminary stage, or to assess several options on the
table) and a later stage of public involvement, when decisions can be
made based on the information developed by the preliminary
investigation.
D. Alternative Suggestions for ParticipatoryReform
The need to reform the rulemaking process to improve participation has been raised before. Two recent proposals, one by David
Fontana and one by Jennifer Nou, stand out. Fontana, concerned with
109. Golden, supra note 40, at 252-53, and West, supra note 40, at 71, both find that

there are rulemaking cases where there are very few, or no, comments. Other issues
have comments almost completely from business actors. That is not to say that there
are not rulemaking cases where there will be substantial public participation. West
addresses some, West, supra note 40, and the three case studies in Cuflar, supra note
40, generated substantial discussion. But this reinforces the point that different meth-

ods of participation are suitable to different cases.
110. Though experience shows that with efforts, a selected member of the public can
be informed and achieve an in-depth discussion, as described above, many issues
agencies handle do not sufficiently interest the public to allow this to happen.
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the lack of participation accompanying rulemaking, proposes creating
incentives for agencies to increase participation by providing different
levels of judicial deference for different modes of participation. 1 '
Under Fontana's reform, agencies have two forms of participation to
choose from. The first is the regular Notice and Comment process. If
the agency chooses that process, it would publish a statement counting
the number of non-repetitive and relevant comments submitted and a
breakdown of who submitted these comments. 1 2 If the agency received a sufficient number of comments of that kind, the courts would
award its decision special deference, under the logic that increased
participation contributes to the democratic nature of the decision making process.
Alternatively, an agency can choose to use deliberative Notice
and Comment, in which it will convene citizen juries, which will meet
and deliberate on the proposals and submit comments.1 13 That model
will also provide the agency with special deference from the court.
The idea of using such a model of extended participation was not
originated by Fontana,1 14 but the application to rulemaking was his
own.
Fontana's suggested reform improves on the existing Notice and
Comment model by increasing the options available for formulating
rules and rewarding agencies for increasing participation. It has two
major advantages. First, it is clear and simple. There are only two
models available and they are very well defined and clear. Second,
there is an elegant incentive mechanism. If an agency achieves increased participation it benefits by reducing the level of judicial review, and thus the chances that the agency's decision will be
1
overturned will be reduced. 15
However, Fontana's idea suffers from several drawbacks. First,
he is assuming that increased participation is in all cases a benefit.
However, as discussed above, that is not necessarily the case. De111. David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative ProcedureAct: Democracy Index
Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (2005).
112. Id. at 89-90.
113. For further detail on this proposal, see id. at 91-94.
114. E.g., LEIB, supra note 34, at 12-29; Crosby et al., supra note 36.

115. Assuming, of course, that courts will cooperate with the changed standard. See,
e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 35, at 122-123 (arguing that judges should manipulate the
legal standard to prevent deregulatory changes). However, the Chevron experience
suggests that courts will generally be deferent if a deference standard is imposed. See
Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998) (showing high
deference under Chevron); Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992).
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pending on what the agency wants to achieve, increased participation
may or may not be a benefit. If the agency is trying to make a decision on a scientific question that it expects will lead to little public
controversy, such as the helicopter design rule described above, going
the deliberative Notice and Comment route is simply wasteful, since it
is not useful. However, if the agency does not go that route andunsurprising in a non-controversial rulemaking-receives only a few
comments, or only comments from industry, it is punished by increasingly close judicial review. The public may not take it to court, but
the regulated industries may, even just one dissatisfied organization.
Why give one disaffected party such an advantage? Even in a case
where there is serious participation by industry, as in the example
opening this article of OSHA's attempt to change safety rules governing shipyards, the number of comments is not necessarily a good
measure of the democratic nature of the process. Generally, it is not
clear that a higher number of different comments is by itself a positive
thing. There may simply not be much to say on an issue. Why give
agencies the incentive to generate or encourage useless comments to
avoid more searching judicial review? Or punish them for the lack of
such comments? Generally, the Fontana reform suffers from the same
problem as the current Notice and Comment system. It is not sufficiently sensitive to the need for different levels of participation in different situations.
Nou suggests evaluating proposed rules by using a deliberative
forum-either citizen juries or deliberative polls-to assess their costs
and benefits.' 1 6 Nou acknowledges that this method should not be
used in every rule, though she bases that idea on cost considerations.
She suggests limiting deliberative cost-benefit analysis to rules where
there is no ready market, for example, where human life or environmental issues need to be given monetary value." 7 The decisions
would be bounded by expert knowledge.' 18 Nou suggests that deliberative cost-benefit analysis be used at the alternative evaluation stage.
In other words, the outcome of the citizens' deliberations will become
part of the materials experts use to design the proposed rule and to
assess which form of regulation is best.
This reform has the advantage of providing for more meaningful
participation. Participation will be more meaningful both because it
will occur earlier in the process-thus allowing those participating to
determine the format of the rule-and because it balances nicely the
116. Nou, supra note 61.
117. Id. at 622.
118. Id. at 623.
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role of expertise with creating participation. It also limits the costly
participation mechanism to a range of specific situations.
However, what Nou is proposing is essentially only a component,
a step, in the review of a rule. She does not address the rest of the
process, and does not really offer an alternative to existing Notice and
Comment. In addition, like most cost-benefit analysis the proposal
does not remove the need for other value choices that a cost-benefit
approach does not capture, for example, the choice between dangerous
species and economic growth, or between different water uses. The
next section will elaborate on these issues and suggest a reform aimed
at improving the rulemaking mechanism.
III.
SUGGESTED REFORM

As explained above, the main concern of this article is two
problems of the Notice and Comment procedure: its limitations as a
mechanism of participation, and its use as a cookie cutter model,
which is (incorrectly) viewed as equally applicable in all cases. Legislative and regulatory over-reliance on this single technique often fails
to produce meaningful review of agency decisions. Notice and Comment can miss the point in either direction, producing too much public
input in some cases, and too little in others. Sometimes, it will not
achieve the goals set by agency members. Notice and Comment can
even be harmful. When the agency has this cut-and-dried method
available, unaccompanied by any requirement to consider the actual
goals of public participation, it is less likely to consider or adopt the
more sophisticated and deep forms of participation that have been suggested by participation scholars. Agencies, already overburdened and
under-financed, will simply take the pre-set route. Notice and Comment requirements can undermine more deliberative participation
methods, even if the original solution, while not necessarily addressing every factor, addressed most concerns and was seen as legitimate
by most of the affected population. For example, the agency may
have to set aside a consensus reached using a deliberative method as a
result of a later Notice and Comment process, mandated either through
judicial review or the threat of it. After all, it only takes one dissatisfied party to appeal, as can be seen from the fact that negotiated
rulemaking did not achieve a lower level of litigation than non-negotiated Notice and Comment rules.' 19
119. Coglianese, supra note 66, at 1301-09; see also Langbein & Kerwin, supra
note 89, at 614-15.
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To return to the examples mentioned at the beginning of the article, in relation to whether to add seatbelts to large school busses, there
is clearly strong community sentiment on a number of issues that are
not purely scientific, as well as on some issues that are scientific. Parents are concerned about the safety of their children, but also about
how their local school districts spend money. Bus operators are concerned about discipline and safety. Bus manufacturers worry about
costs, as do school boards. While the agency conducted hearings and
had a Notice and Comment process, the comments on the regulations.gov website each stand on their own; some of them demonstrate
a high level of knowledge, some of them simply pick one value and
stake an emotional position. 120 In other words, there is no dialogue
among the parties. In a case like this one, after a presentation of the
data and the options, a community dialogue might well have helped
the agency and others to better assess the practical options and consider the real trade-offs. Alternatively, even where dialogue among
the parties exists, participatory mechanisms may facilitate implementation by achieving a workable agreement.
On the other hand, sometimes Notice and Comment participation
is unsuitable because it provides for too much public participation, and
of the wrong kind. It can give opponents a way to delay and encumber proposed regulation; such opponents can simply submit a large
number of comments each requiring an answer, and can later go on to
an appeal on grounds that one issue, even if trivial, was not answered
to their satisfaction. By providing regulatees with a mechanism to
raise any comment, not necessarily scientific, and require that it be
addressed by the agency, it may force other considerations into the
picture. The combination of Notice and Comment and the "hard look"
doctrine means that regulated industry or interest groups can take advantage of the process to delay regulation and limit even non-prob21
lematic agency action.'
120. See supra note 5.
121. McGarity, supra note 10, at 1397; McGarity, supra note 23, at 531-33. For

studies about the unsurprising advantage of organized interests in using access avenues, see Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Interest Groups, Advisory Committees,
and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy, 45 AM. J. POL. Sci. 799 (2001)
(showing that interest groups have substantial influence on the composition of advisory committees to the bureaucracy, not just on legislative outcomes); David Barron
& Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. CT. REV. 201,
231-33; Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684-85 (1975); Lucig Danielian & Benjamin Page, The Heavenly Chorus: Interest Group Voices on TV News, 38 AM. J. POL. ScI, 1056, 1062-63
(1994) (suggesting interest groups have substantial representation in the media and
among interest groups business is well represented). For studies that suggest that or-
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A.

The Alternative

As discussed above, the problem with the APA Notice and Comment procedures is that they do not allow agencies to tailor their participation model to the goals they are trying to achieve, and
accordingly, they may have unintended costs without real benefits. In
addition, they provide for participation at a very late stage in the process. 122 Allowing better-tailored participation mechanisms may help
with efficiency as well, either by increasing the efficiency of the
rulemaking process itself or by facilitating implementation and by
changing the judicial review provisions of the APA.
A new model would need to balance the public's interests with
those of the agencies. The public needs a process in place which provides genuinely meaningful review. Agencies need a process that allows them space to maneuver and tailor the review to the needs of a
specific rulemaking. Both will lose rather than benefit from the wrong
kind of review.
I suggest allowing agencies to choose, within certain constraints,
a model of oversight that is suitable to the content of the rulemaking
and the stage in the process. The evaluation will then be done in two
stages. The agency's choice of review mechanism can be challenged.
However, if it is not challenged, an agency can only be evaluated
under the logic relevant to the review mechanism.
Two caveats are in order. This reform addresses only the external review of rulemaking. Many agencies already have in place elabo123
rate mechanisms for conducting internal reviews of rulemaking.
However, observers generally consider these mechanisms insufficient
and require some form of external review. This reform addresses how
that review will be conducted.
In addition, deliberative mechanisms have been suggested for a
number of years, and as was described above, are the subject of an
extensive, perhaps even gigantic, literature. Peer review has also been
used, though on a much smaller scale than Notice and Comment and
in more specific contexts, and it has not been considered as a legitiganized interests in this context does not necessarily mean business interests, see
Gregory Caldiera & John Wright, Amicus Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990) (showing that the Su-

preme Court is responsive to a wide range of interests);

BRONWEN MORGAN, SOCIAL

CITIZENSHIP IN THE SHADOW OF COMPETITION: THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS OF REG-

215-16 (2003) (suggesting consumers can have impact on
regulatory policy as long as they learn to speak the language of economic rationality).
122. Though some agencies have attempted to solve that problem by using pre-notice procedures such as regulatory negotiation and advance notices.
123. Kerwin, supra note 11, at 80-81.
ULATORY JUSTIFICATION
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mate part of the rulemaking process. The idea of doing away with
Notice and Comment has also been implemented. This is what direct
rules, which are supposed to be used when there is no controversy, are
about.1 24 The novelty in this article is twofold: applying the insight
that the form of oversight can-and should-be tailored to the problem at hand to rulemaking; and giving the agency an official choice
between options, thus legitimating deviations from Notice and
Comment.
Under this proposal, before publication of a final rule, an agency
will be required to use an oversight process at least once, and preferably more than once, in various stages of the rulemaking. When an
agency uses an oversight model before the final stage of rulemaking,
that process should accompany the final rule and count as part of the
total oversight process. Early-stage oversight procedures might, for
example, include a deliberative process that evaluated alternatives
and/or suggested new ones, or peer-review of the science involved
before it is put forward as the basis for a rule.
The oversight process will have two major stages. First, agencies
will decide on the oversight model suitable for their participation
goals, and publish in the Federal Register (and on the agency website)
a general memo which describes the process chosen and explains why
that process is appropriate, and a very general statement of the rule.
Parties will have 30 days to challenge the model of oversight suggested. If, however, they do not challenge the scheme, the agency's
rulemaking can only be challenged at a later stage on the basis of the
125
particular oversight scheme it chose.
B.

The Three Oversight Models

The available forms of oversight can be grouped under three categories, though the details will vary dramatically across topics and
issues, and an agency can and probably will use different models at
different stages of the process. When an agency wants to focus on
technical issues such as the validity of the science it used, it will sub124. See Lars, supra note 11, at, 423-24 (1999) (claiming that the use of direct rules
allows agencies to circumvent judicial review, and also that they violate the APA).
125. A limited time to review a rule is not a new idea in the United States or abroad.
In the United States, the Congressional Review of Agency Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 801-808 (2006), delays the starting date of regulations for a limited time of sixty
days, in which the Congress can overturn the rule. The stronger form of limited time
exists in several European countries, a classic example being France, where a law's
constitutionality can only be challenged before the Conseil Constiutionel, the Constitutional Court, in the limited time between its passage and its promulgation. See JOHN
BELL, FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (1992).
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mit the decision to peer review.1 26 When an agency wants to inform
the public and get information about preferences of stakeholders and
alternatives, it will probably use existing Notice and Comment procedures, possibly with the addition of surveys or oral hearings. When an
agency is focusing on consensus building, facilitating implementation,
or increasing its legitimacy, it will be likely to choose a deliberative
model based on the most appropriate participation mechanism sug27
gested by the deliberative democracy scholarship.'
The choice between alternatives may be greatly influenced by
statute if Congress has already specified the criteria on which the decision should be based. For example, the Endangered Species Act requires that in relation to listing decisions the secretary "shall make
determinations required by subsection (a)(1) of this section solely on
the basis of the best scientific and commercial data available to
hinm."' 128 While the powerful consequences of a listing decision made
the listing process inevitably political, the law itself does not reflect
that politicization. Currently, one of the major criticisms of environmental groups is that politicizing the process undermines Congress's
intent in passing the statute. 129 However, as long as the law stays as it
is. it appears clear that for the listing stage the agency would need to
use peer review to evaluate the science. In addition, the use of Habitat
Conservation Plans in the later stages to moderate the harsh consequences of listing 130 can be seen as including a more participatory
element.
126. Peer reviews have been used by agencies, to a limited extent, to evaluate certain
decisions. OIRA has recommended use of peer review to evaluate scientific data,

though not Regulatory Impact Analysis.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,

Fi-

http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/memoranda/fy2005/m05-03.pdf (2004). The memorandum makes some interesting suggestions about the format of peer review. See also J.B. Ruhl & James E.
Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2006)
(describing the controversy around the use of peer review in certain regulatory contexts, the perceptions of such use and the lack of real data about its necessity and
effectiveness). Though peer review has not counted as a substitute to Notice and
Comment.
127. As developed in the next section, while an agency may always generally desire
consensus building and facilitating implementation, it will take special care to do so
when it anticipates, or has faced, special problems in relation to an issue. In those
situations it will want increased public participation.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2006).
129. For an in depth analysis, see Thomas Jakob Kerr, Of Politics and Polar Bears:
the Bush Administration and the Endangered Species Act, 14-17 (Apr. 27, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
130. Id.; Jennifer Jester, Habitat Conservation Plans under Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act: The Alabama Beach Mouse and The Unfulfilled Mandate of Species Recovery, 26 B.C. ENVn. AFF. L. REV. 131, 132-33 (1998).
NAL INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
HeinOnline -- 12 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 353 2008-2009

LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12:321

Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Whitman v. American
Tracking Associations that the only thing the EPA could consider
when setting National Air Quality Standards are health effects. This
excludes costs from being considered. 13 1 If the decisions should really be made on that basis alone, the scientific basis should be evaluated through peer review. This is nothing new; the APA has always
been the default, and specific language in an agency statute has always
trumped it.
To use an example from the opposite side of the spectrum, Peter
L. Strauss reads the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966132 and the Department of Transportation Act of 1966133 as emphasizing local authority and interest group participation. In that situation, the
Department of Transportation should have used a deliberative mechanism and respected its results, and it did; Strauss describes in detail the
adoption of a new framework for highway planning which emphasized
participation of local interests as a balance against the views of the
administrative technocrats.1 34 He demonstrates how the federal government involved local interests in the process and gave weight to
their views. 135 This supports Strauss's conclusion that Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 136 was wrongly decided and demon137
strates the Court's lack of understanding of the process.
If, however, the agency statute does not explicitly set the form of
oversight, the agency will have to choose. The criteria for choice between the three models should be the nature of the question and the
scope of anticipated conflict, i.e., from whom does the agency expect
objections or suggested modifications, and how intense is any opposition likely to be, either at the rulemaking stage or at a later stage.
There is, after all, limited use to preventing conflict during rulemaking

131. 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001).
132. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-574, 80 Stat. 766, 771.
133. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931, 934 § 4(f)
(codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2005)).
134. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and JudicialControls Over

Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1285-88
(1992).
135. Id. at 1290, 1296-1311.
136. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
137. Strauss, supra note 134, at 1318-19; Peter L. Strauss, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe-of Politics and Law, Young Lawyers and the Highway Goliath, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES, supra note 28, at 258, 307-11.
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if by doing so one sets up serious problems during the implementation
stage.' 38 This is described in more detail below.
Any of these models, if candidly defended and carried through,
will increase the legitimacy of the process, as discussed in Part III.D.
All of them raise concerns about abuse, as discussed in Part IV. The
next sections address each of the suggested models and are followed
by a discussion of judicial review. They describe the situations in
which an agency would use a particular model of oversight, describe
the model shortly, and point out some issues related to the implementation of the described model. The following chapters address reasons
why this reform would be an improvement on the current system, and
then address concerns about the reform.
1.

Peer Review

Peer review means submitting the decision to evaluation by experts in the relevant fields, and receiving a detailed evaluation of the
proposal from them. If the agency does not anticipate serious conflict
or any interest by outside stakeholders in the rulemaking, the decision
should simply be reviewed for its technical or scientific correctness.
Similarly, if the conflict will center only on technical or scientific conclusions, such conclusions are what must be evaluated. Peer review is
the proper method here. In situations where the conflict is only between the agency and regulated industry, the agency may also want to
emphasize its professionalism by limiting the evaluation to the science
that supports its position. Finally, an agency may base its work on
scientific or technical expertise only because Congress has decided
that such is the way to reach a decision or because it is preparing the
background to be used in the later stages. In all these situations, the
best way to evaluate it is through peer review.
It may be doubted whether there are any purely scientific questions in the administrative state;' 39 many questions that are scienceheavy have strong value dimensions.' 40 But there are clearly cases
where the law requires the agency to base a decision on expertise and
138. The focus should be on the scope and not the level because there can be very
intense conflict when an agency regulates an industry in a way that is unacceptable to
that industry, but it is not clear that that is a point for consensus seeking.
139. Fischer, supra note 35; Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands:
The Limits of Science in Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV, 1255, 1261-63

(2004) (showing the EPA use science to avoid close scrutiny of its work).
140. For example, what level of pollution will create what level of health risk may be
a scientific question, but to what degree to limit pollution raises questions of which
level of risk is acceptable to a community and what limitations is that community
willing to place on economic activity to reduce risks.
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expertise only, where the values to be considered have been predetermined. There are also cases where the public interest is very low, and
the politicians and the public are happy to leave the decision to the
experts. There are also cases in which an agency's job is to regulate,
based on science, an industry that will naturally raise objections. In
those cases, peer review is useful.
Even in cases where the decision rests heavily upon value judgment, substantial amounts of knowledge are needed if the discussion is
to move forward. For example, in the rule about seatbelts on school
busses, conclusions need to be drawn about the chances of accidents,
the damage from accidents without seatbelts, the possible damages
from seatbelts, and costs. This information about different alternatives
can be collected and prepared by the experts, with the costs and benefits of each alternative described, and then submitted to peer review to
guarantee the validity of the work and increase faith in its accuracy.
Using peer review in these situations will not only save resources
by not requiring agencies to go through a pro forma Notice and Comment process, it will prevent the agency from using claims of scientific expertise as a smoke screen to problematic decision-making
practices. Such practices were suggested by Cary Coglianese and
Gary E. Marchant as mechanisms used by the EPA in at least certain
cases. 141
Furthermore, cases where the agency's decision is based mostly
on scientific expertise are those where concerns about the lack of expertise from the participating public are the strongest. 142 These are
also the situations where the advantages of consensus are most in
doubt; it is unclear that more people involved will help arrive at a
143
correct or better scientific decision.
The question is what form peer review should take. Several
things are clear. First, the decision should be reviewed by experts
from all the disciplines involved. Second, the decision should be assessed for its connection to the facts and to the methodology used in
getting to those facts. Therefore, reviewers should comment on the
data relied upon, on the methodology used in collecting and analyzing
it, and on the conclusions drawn from it. Third, to assure the availability of enough competent reviewers some form of compensation is
141. Coglianese & Marchant, supra note 139, at 1265-66.
142. Rossi, supra note 35, at 215-18.
143. Id. at 217; Cary Coglianese, Is Consensus an AppropriateBasis for Regulatory
Policy?, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRAcTs: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 93, 94 (Eric Orts & Kurt
Deketelaere eds., 2001).
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necessary. 144 Fourth, the reviewers should not disqualify a decision
on the sole grounds that they disagree with it (which is not as impossible as it seems-reviewers for peer journals are required to assess
articles based on the validity of their methods, not on whether they
agree with the theory). Generally, reviewers should assess a decision
as well-based or not sufficiently well-based. The agency will often
have to make a policy decision in the absence of scientific certainty,
and should be allowed discretion to do so.
I suggest that reviewers complete a short form (parallel to that
used by academic reviewers of articles submitted to peer review journals) assessing the decision as: (1) well grounded in existing scientific
knowledge; (2) sufficiently grounded in existing scientific knowledge,
but raises some concerns due to methodological problems with data
relied upon, but not to the level of disqualifying the data; (3) scientific
uncertainty; (4) conflicts within expert community, and agency followed majority opinion; (5) conflicts within expert community, and
agency followed minority opinion; or finally, (6) not grounded in scientific knowledge.
The reviewer should then explain briefly, in both technical and
non-technical language, the basis for their views.
2.

Notice and Comment

Notice and Comment is appropriate when the agency wants to
glean information from the public or the relevant industry and does
not have direct contact with all the concerned individuals. The agency
does not want to share decision-making authority (or is legally prevented from doing so) and is not looking to create a consensus or
dialogue. For example, if an agency wants to regulate the industry by
limiting certain kinds of behavior, it sometimes is not interested in
garnering the agreement of the industry; in fact, if the industry is completely happy with the agency proposals, the agency will probably be
accused of capture or ineffectiveness. 145 In these situations, the parties raising objections need to be heard, because they have information
that no one else has, but not given decision making power. That can
be achieved through Notice and Comment, the emphasis in this case
being on information-gathering rather than dialogue-creation. Simi144. This mirrors Fontana's concern that his deliberative juries should be paid.
Fontana, supra note 111, at 93.

145. As happened, for example, to the Interstate Commerce Commission, accused of
equating the public interest with that of the railroads. See DAN B. WOOD & RICHARD
W.

WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DE-

MOCRACY

18 (1994).
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larly, Notice and Comment may be a good default: if the agency is not
sure about the scope of the conflict, Notice and Comment may allow it
to test the water. Of course, if the agency knows that Notice and
Comment has worked well in the past there is no reason for it to
change its method of oversight.
Currently, much of the work agencies do is complete before the
notice stage, which is one of the reasons the effectiveness of the process is in doubt. 146 Hopefully, by allowing procedures before the final
stage to be considered as part of the review when judicially reviewed,
this reform will enable incorporation of review in earlier stages of the
policymaking process. The Notice and Comment process should be
complemented with surveys where the agency wants information
about the views of the general public, and with oral hearings where, in
the agency's view, that is potentially useful.
The agency often cannot expect regulated industry to be happy
about regulation, and in those cases, the goal is to prevent mistakes in
decisions, but not to achieve consensus. In addition, Notice and Comment has the advantage of familiarity; agencies have been using it at
least since the 1960s, and do not have to invest in learning a new
process. Accordingly, where it serves the goal of meaningful review,
it should be used.
3. Deliberative Democracy Mechanisms
If the matter at hand has produced deep-set value clashes and/or
strong public interest, has resulted in implementation problems in the
past, or if the agency anticipates that it will be controversial, a deliberative process is in order. 147 Clearly those mechanisms are not useful
or appropriate in every rulemaking. However, they should be considered as a tool for problem preventing or problem solving, applicable at
a number of points along the policymaking continuum.
Starting from the end, deliberative mechanisms may be useful
when implementing a rule and running into problems. Implementation is a tricky process and often runs into as many problems as the

146. Kerwin, supra note 11, at 74-82; West, supra note 40, at 69. At the notice
stage, the agency has generally chosen a policy alternative and is simply subjecting it
to minor changes and approval/disapproval.
147. The agency can also use a deliberative process when it wants to generate new
ideas and options (though in practice, the areas when it's actually done tend to have
high levels of conflicts) or to examine its general priorities. For example, the EPA's
citizen jury on climate change asked citizens to rank alternatives and discuss what
options, in general, should be taken. That left the problem definition to the jury. See
JEFFERSON CENTER,

supra note 82, 3-4; see also Nou, supra note 61, at 124.
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initial rulemaking.1 48 While implementation is not officially part of
the rulemaking process, use of the deliberative option at the point of
transition from rulemaking to implementation can have an effect on
the rulemaking process. For example, the Habitat Conservation Plans
put in place under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), with all the
criticisms raised against them, 149 are an example of the use of a deliberative mechanism to assure that the rules listing a species-and more
importantly, the intent of the Act-are implemented. They may also
reduce some of the tension and struggles surrounding the rulemaking.
In a Habitat Conservation Plan, landowners or developers agree to set
aside certain territory within a species' habitat where an endangered
species is protected in return for a permit to harm the species elsewhere, as an exception to the ESA's prohibition on "takings" of listed
species.150 Currently, there are 650 such plans approved.151
During the rulemaking process itself, deliberative mechanisms
can be used to evaluate a proposed rule and see the public's reaction,
which, in theory, is the goal of Notice and Comment. Agencies can
use deliberative mechanisms instead in cases where the agency believes the rule is going to be politically controversial and is willing to
alter it to reduce or avoid the controversy or to facilitate later implementation. This can be done by submitting the proposed rule to a
citizen jury or deliberative poll.

152

Alternatively, an interactive meet-

ing can be done to acquaint citizens with the issues and evaluate the
148. As demonstrated in Pressman and Wildavsky's classic work,
& AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT

MAN

WASHINGTON ARE DASHED
PROGRAMS WORK AT ALL

JEFFERY

L. PRESS-

EXPECTATIONS

IN

IN OAKLAND; OR, WHY IT'S AMAZING THAT FEDERAL

(3rd ed. 1984). See also

EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLE-

(1977); William
H. Clune, A PoliticalModel of Implementation and the Implications of the Model for
Public Policy, Research, and the Changing Role of Lawyers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 47
(1983).
149. See, e.g., Jester, supra note 130, at 134-35; Cameron W Barrows et al., A
Framework for Monitoring Multiple-Species Conservation Plans, 69 J. WILDLIFE
MGMT. 1333, 1334-35 (2005); Frances C. James, Lessons Learnedfrom a Study of
Habitat Conservation Planning, 49 Biosci. 871, 872-73 (1999); M. Nils Peterson et
al., A Tale of Two Species: Habitat Conservation Plans as Bounded Conflict, 68 J.
WILDLIFE MGMT. 743, 756-58 (2004); Matthew E. Rahn et al., Species Coverage in
Multispecies Habitat Conservation Plans: Where's the Science?, 56 Bioscl. 613,
616-19 (2006).
150. Craig W. Thomas, Habitat Conservation Planning: Certainly Empowered,
Somewhat Deliberative,Questionably Democratic,29 POL. & Soc'Y 105, 108 (2001).
151. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Conservation Plans and Agreements Database,
http://ecos.fws.gov/conserve-plans/public.jsp (follow the "Nationwide" hyperlink,
MENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES A LAW

then select "Regional (Summary) Report" button) (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
152. These methods are suggested, with some important variations, by Nou and
Fontana. See Nou, supra note 61, at 617-24; Fontana, supra note 111, at 91-96.
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rule. This type of proceeding was conducted when a citizen jury evaluated the proposed Clinton health plan in 1993; while several other
options were discussed by the jury, the focus was on the Clinton plan
and the jury ended up voting against it.153 While this was not a
rulemaking, it is an example of the public assessing a policy proposal.
When done as part of rulemaking, the process should include an option to suggest changes.
In another example, the EPA conducted a large online dialogue
on public involvement in EPA decisions. The dialogue included both
planned panels and the general public, and a different EPA office was
on call on each of the ten days of discussion. The materials were then
used to create training brochures to improve public involvement prac154
tices at the EPA, and a policy paper was issued.
Similarly, evaluating alternatives or defining the details of the
rule, and certainly the choice of alternative, can be accomplished using any of the mechanisms described above, as well as through regneg. In fact, this is an excellent stage to use deliberative mechanisms,
since it gives the participants a chance to provide input at an early
stage of the process.
Reg-neg, for example, has been used to choose the best alternative and develop the details of a rule proposal. 55 In another case involving a wide-ranging study conducted in relation to the building of a
dam in Arizona, deliberative participation led to a substantive change
in the rule. One of the mechanisms used in that process was determining the preferences of each stake-holder and then evaluating alternatives on how well they matched preferences. Creighton explains that
often parties are surprised at the results, since the option they initially
prefer is not always the one that best achieves their value-preferences. 156 In that case, the option that initially seemed most desirable
to business owners and agriculture (having one dam) was seen, after
closer evaluation and deliberation, to not really promote their preferences as much as the option of two smaller dams; that option also
fared best under the criteria important to environmental groups and
157
ended up being adopted by the policymakers.
153. Crosby, supra note 96, at 162.
154. Patricia A. Bonner et al., Bringing the Public and the Government Together
through On-Line Dialogues, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE Civic ENGAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 74, at 142,
147.
155. Harter, supra note 66, at 33; Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 89, at 625-27.
156. See Creighton, supra note 30, at 235-36.
157. However, a lawsuit stopped construction on one of the two dams, and only one
ended up built. Id. at 236.
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Finally, even before the development of policy alternatives, deliberative mechanisms can be used to suggest options and put issues
on the agenda as discussed above. Two examples demonstrate this.
In a large-scale project, fourteen city and two "national" interactive
meetings (including over 1,100 participants) were conducted for the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to discuss water challenges. 5 8 The
Corps had its own ideas of challenges, but a large part of meeting time
was dedicated to brainstorming and raising other challenges. 159 After
the main challenges were identified, solutions were suggested.1 60 The
Corps used the results to formulate a report on its priorities in the
issue. 16 1 This format allowed the agency to draw on the public both
for agenda setting (to identify the problems) and for developing alternatives (to identify possible solutions).
In another example, in 2002 the Jefferson Center conducted a
citizen jury sponsored by the EPA to discuss global climate change
and possible options.162 This citizen jury had the potential to help the
EPA both in setting an agenda and suggesting alternatives and policy
options the EPA staff may not have considered.
These examples are only a small sample of ways that agencies
can use deliberative mechanisms in different stages of the rulemaking
process. The details of the appropriate form of participation will have
to be determined on a case-by-case basis. A review of all the existing
163
literature on such mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper.
Since applying deliberative mechanisms in rulemaking is still a relatively new idea, it will not be surprising if still other novel applications of known mechanisms, or perhaps even completely new
mechanisms, are eventually developed and used.
Several observations are in order. The first is that, as noted
above, this kind of intensive participation often requires substantial
time and resource investment on the part of the participants, both to
educate themselves and to be truly involved in the decision-making
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

163.
164.
164-65.
163-65.

82, at 2-4.
For an extensive review and many examples, see, for example,
JEFFERSON CENTER, supra note

CREIGHTON,

supra note 30, at 229-40; Fung, supra note 31; Fung, supra note 106, at 14-23; JOHN
See generally
GASTIL, POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND DELIBERATION (2008).
Carolyn M. Hendriks, When the Forum Meets Interest Politics: Strategic Uses of Pub-

lic Deliberation, 34 POL. & Soc'Y 571 (2006); Carolyn M. Hendriks et al., Turning
Up the Heat: Partisanship in Deliberative Innovation, 55 POL. STUD. 362 (2006);
Terrence Kelly, Unlocking the Iron Cage: Public Administration in the Deliberative
Democratic Theory of Jirgen Habermas, 36 ADMIN. & Soc. 38 (2004).
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process. It should therefore only be undertaken when useful, in order
to not waste public resources and participants' valuable time. For example, deliberative mechanisms are appropriate where there is a high
level of controversy, or where the agency does not have good ideas as
to what to do. Participation may generate possible alternatives that are
worthy of consideration. Indeed, some agencies are already using advance notice proceedings for exactly that purpose. 164 Also, it is ap-

propriate to use a deliberative democracy process when
implementation is going to be very heavily dependent on community
cooperation.
A common worry about any forum that allows citizens access to
government is that organized and resource-rich groups can benefit
more than the public at large from adoption of these mechanisms. 65
While this is certainly a legitimate concern, the potential problem may
be less serious in situations where deliberative democracy mechanisms are used, as such procedures emphasize representation and access. The remedy is not complete; in any public process, organized,
strongly interested groups tend to be heard more than disadvantaged
or diffused ones. 166 However, using deliberative mechanisms can go a
long way towards ameliorating this problem. In some anecdotal examples, scholars have demonstrated that when a local government policy would have a significant effect on their interests, the poor, the lesseducated, and racial and gender minorities participate more than other
groups. 167
Third, the discussion above raises options but does not set in
stone what agencies should do in each case. The design of each mechanism will require careful thought and expertise; there is great scope
here for public participation professionals to contribute from their experience and knowledge.

164. LUBBERS, supra note 12, at 156; Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and
Negotiation: The Contours of Public Participationin Agency Rulemaking, I J.L. &
POL'Y FOR INFO.

Soc'y 59, 74, 79 (2005).

165. Rossi, supra note 35, at 238-39.
166. For a discussion of the inherent advantages of organized groups compared to
"one shotters", those who do not regularly participate in the process, in connection
with the courts, see Marc Galanter, Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95, 97-104 (1974).
167. Fung, Deliberative Democracy, Chicago Style, supra note 69, at 129; Baiocchi,
supra note 70, 67-68. Though Fung found that while participation was higher in low
income, low education neighborhoods than commonly perceived, Fung also found
that, within any given neighborhood, those who were advantaged participated at
higher rates.
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Example of a "Fuzzy" Situation

A tricky situation is when an agency anticipates intense conflict,
but only with industry. In that situation, any of the models may be
justified using a different rationale. An agency may justify peer review by pointing out that its job is to impose its will on the industry,
and the only question is one of expertise: if a rule can be shown to be
scientifically valid no other justification is needed. It can justify Notice and Comment on the grounds of needing to learn the thinking
within the industry while at the same time limiting the dialogue and
making it more one-sided. Also, an agency can suggest that implementation will be easier if the decision is done through a more deliberative mechanism. In that situation, as in the other unavoidable fuzzy
situations, agencies are going to need some leeway to learn from experience, and mistakes are inevitable. However, agencies do have expertise and political experience, and they will probably be right more
often than they are wrong. Furthermore, they are in the best position
to learn from experience.
Interestingly, and as developed below, the logic behind the three
models of oversight corresponds to different stages of the development of the administrative state. 168 As is often the case in the administrative state, rather than being "left behind" after their premises have
been challenged, these models simply exist side by side, with built-in
contradictions and mismatch, and an agency can expect to be criticized for being inadequate from the point of view of any of them.
Peer review parallels the logic of expertise, promoted by the progressive supporters of the early New Deal agencies.' 69 It evaluates
whether decisions are actually based on expertise. Notice and Comment allows many groups to have a say, but does not create a real
dialogue; it promotes expression of contrasting views and then allows
any actor to challenge the agency in court for not responding in accord
with his particular ideas. Notice and Comment therefore suffers from
the problems of interest group pluralism; all groups must have a say
168. This discussion draws on Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53
VAND. L. REV., 1389, 1398-1416 (2000), and Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of
American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 1748-60 (1975). Schiller
addresses the move from the emphasis on expertise to pluralism and then to a participatory model. Stewart discusses the problems with the new emphasis on participation. See also Rossi, supra note 35, at 196-250 (discussing three models of decision
making that correspond to the three models--expertocratic, pluralist, and civic
republican).
169. Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence
of the New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 413-41(2007).
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and their words must be taken seriously, but no attempt is made to
achieve a consensual solution and it has all the problems of pluralism. 170 Finally, deliberative mechanisms fit the movement to increase
participation and deliberation, a movement that resulted from disillusionment with pluralism and tried to give more meaningful say to a
larger part of the populace. 171
C. Judicial Review
Judicial review as a mechanism of agency accountability has its
own problems. Some drawbacks to this approach are: (1) lack of expertise on the part of judges, (2) the possibility that a judge may have
an agenda, and (3) the addition of delays to the process with a corresponding decrease in efficiency. 172 It is also unclear how effective
judicial review actually is, since agencies, subject to many other political pressures, may be more sensitive to political will than to the
courts (though no one will say courts have no impact at all). 1 73 How170. Schiller, supra note 168, at 1399.
171. Id. at 1413.
172.

JAMES

Q.

WILSON,

BUREAUCRACY-WHAT

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Do

AND

Do IT, 282-90 (1989) (stating that judicial review negatively affects the
costs of agencies' operations, agencies' willingness to innovate, the power relations
between actors and the policy outcomes); Elliott, supra note 1, at 1494 (arguing that
judicial review makes process more cumbersome); McGarity, supra note 23, at 528,
530, 532-33 (contending that judicial review both makes process more cumbersome
and is a tool in the hands of hostile anti-administrative state judges to curtail agency
powers); Richard J. Pierce, JudicialReview of Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, at 63-64 (1997) (maintaining that
courts, inconsiderate of agencies resource constraints, distort agency actions by forcing them to put more effort and resources into one subset of cases, those that are
litigated, over all the other things the agency wants to do); Frank B. Cross, Shattering
the FragileCasefor JudicialReview of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1315-1321
(1999) (claiming that judges have their own built in biases); Martin Shapiro, Judicial
Delegation Doctrines: The US, Britain, and France, 25 W. EURO. POL., 173, 174-75
(2002), (arguing that judicial review creates a principal-agent problem between the
legislature and the courts, since the courts have their own agenda); Mashaw, The Story
of State Farm, supra note 28, 335-36, (reasoning that courts are insensible to the
complex realities of regulation and can make decisions that miss the point). On the
other hand, many scholars believe judicial review of agencies is necessary to prevent
abuses by agencies. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 10, at 442; McCubbins et al., supra
note 40, at 272 (maintaining that encroachment on policy making by the court is a
danger); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Critiqueof Active JudicialReview of Administrative Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV., 599, 628, 631-35 (1997); Patricia
M. Wald, JudicialReview in the Time of Cholera, 49 ADMIN. L. REV., 659, 665-66,
670(1997).
173. See Scott Furlong, Political Influences on the Bureaucracy-the Bureaucracy
Speaks, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 39 (1998), where he finds that agencies
consider the President and Congress as more important in determining what they do
WHY THEY

than the courts. See also SIMON

HALLIDAY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND COMPLIANCE WITH
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ever, with the administrative state being ever-present and powerful, 174
citizens, politicians and scholars are understandably concerned about
the accountability of agencies.1 75 Courts are one respected and acknowledged mechanism for maintaining accountability. Indeed, in
certain ways, there is no substitute for what courts can do. Courts
provide a forum for checking agencies that can be triggered by a single private actor. Courts are a forum where claims of rights and legality take precedence over politics, where generalists can check the
biases of experts, and they provide a way for the actions of constituents to alert an overworked Congress to problems with agency actions.176 Judicial review is therefore an important part of the general
accountability framework facing agencies.
How central will courts be to holding agencies accountable for
rulemaking? Other sources or tools of accountability can be considered. For example, in a manner similar to the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) review of rulemaking, which requires agencies to
engage in a cost-benefit analysis, agencies could be required to submit
their suggestion for a review mechanism to a central agency in the
White House, at least for "major" rules. 177 However, given the special
characteristics of judicial review described above, OMB revieweven with a deliberative aspect-will not be a substitute for judicial
review. It does not provide a forum where individual actors can claim
their rights, and it is populated with a specific brand of experts, policy
analysts and economists, with the potential for a specific kind of bias
(though deliberation can counteract that to some degree).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2004). Halliday looked at compliance of administrators in
England's Homeless Persons Units with court decisions and found strong evidence of
non-compliance. Wilson, supra note 172, at 27-28, also points out the importance of
other mechanisms.
174.

STEVEN

P.

CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF

GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACY: POLICYMAKING

ed. 1992);

CHRISTOPHER

F.

14 (2007);

KENNETH

J.

MEIER, POLITICS AND THE

IN THE FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT

1-3 (3rd

EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL

CONTROL OF THE BUREAUCRACY (1990).
175. MICHAEL W. DOWDLE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: CONCEPTUAL, HISTORICAL,
AND EPIsTEMIc MAPPINGS, I (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006). However, several scholars have pointed out that agencies may be subject to stronger accountability mechanisms than elected officials. See CosMo GRAHAM, REGULATING PUBLIC UTILITES: A
CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH 63 (2000).
176. MCCUBBINS et al., supra note 40; Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L. J. 1059, 1078 (2001-2002).

177. Analogizing from the framework set in Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1993), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006). See also Nou's proposal for making the
cost-benefit analysis more deliberative, supra note 61.
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Congress also oversees the bureaucracy, at times very effectively. 17 8 But regardless of how effective Congressional oversight is
or is not, it does not have the resources to oversee every aspect of
rulemaking. Judicial review can catch cases Congress misses, serving
as a "fire alarm" to Congress members, 179 and can also make access
available to groups that lack the necessary resources to mobilize congressional action on their behalf. Accordingly, how the courts will
police the new system is very important.
Judicial review can occur, under this proposal, at either of the
stages of rulemaking. First, judicial review can and should address the
choice of mechanism of review. In this, the guiding rules are the same
that guide an agency. The court will have to assess whether Congress
explicitly determined one of the three models of oversight, parallel to
step one in Chevron. 80 If Congress has not made an explicit determination, the court will have to evaluate the agency's memo explaining
its choice. The court must especially look at the basis of the agency's
assessment of the scope of the conflict. The review must be a reasonableness review: if the agency's decision is reasonable, the court
should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, deferring to
the agency's expertise. The courts already use language that states
that they will not substitute their judgment for that of the agency.' 8 1
But that approach is included in cases where the court did in fact review agency decisions very closely, and without too much deference.
This raises a concern about over-aggressive action by courts anxious
to prevent abuses by agencies, which could work counter to this reform that seeks to provide agencies with more flexibility.182
178.

D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESOVERSIGHT 2, 46-47, 187 (1990); Kathleen Bawn, Choosing Strategies to
Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee SysJOEL

SIONAL

tem, 13 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 101, 102-05 (1997); Louis Fisher, Micromanagementby
Congress: Reality and Mythology, in THE FETrERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
PHER

H.

152 (Crovitz & Rabkin eds., 1989);

CHRISTO-

FOREMAN JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND

(1988); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms,
THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL REGULATION

28 AM. J. POL. ScI. 167 (1984).

179. McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 178.
180. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
181. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
("The Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.").
182. Schiller documents a somewhat similar problem when he describes how the
court's reaction to concerns about the administrative state clashed with the move towards rulemaking, with the result that one reform undermined the other. Schiller,
supra note 11, at 1155-66, 1182-87.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy
HeinOnline -- 12 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 366 2008-2009

20091

TAILORED PARTICIPATION

Such concern is inherent in a vague standard. However, this
vague standard addresses the heart of the matter. The choice of review mechanism is left, under this proposal, to the agency's discretion, since it must be tailored to the situation the agency is facing.
Agencies will have to make a choice, often in the face of uncertainties,
based on their past experience. Sometimes they will make errors, but
they will develop expertise in using the system. If the agency is to
have the necessary room to operate and develop that expertise, overly
specific rules cannot be set for it. This is exactly the kind of situation
where flexible case-by-case review is suitable. There is no real substitute to a reasonableness review by the courts. However, the review
needs to be light handed, especially in the first decade or so, while
agencies are learning to use the system. One way to provide such
flexibility is by adding language to the APA expressly saying that
agencies should be given the benefit of the doubt. However, if agencies do make use of the alternative models of oversight suggested
here, the problem might be less serious than it seems. Experience
shows that judges are more deferential to agencies that use the more
8 3
exhaustive procedures under formal rulemaking or adjudications.
Two examples of this will suffice. Even though the actual standard in
the APA, the "substantial evidence" standard, can be read as less deferential, courts are very deferential to agencies using it in formal adjudications. 184 Similarly, in relation to statutory interpretation, increased
procedures led the court to a higher level of deference to agency
decisions. 185
Judicial review also has a place in evaluating the content and
application of the model chosen by the agencies. However, the
method of review of those mechanisms must vary across the range of
procedures used. The logic of the three models of oversight is substantially different, and therefore the treatment of them must also be
different.
Peer review aims at assuring that agency decision was based on
correct scientific or technological information and was analyzed according to the methodology accepted in the relevant disciplines. Accordingly, it should evaluate whether the agency used appropriate
methods for collecting and analyzing data and that the conclusions
183. Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual Plausibility,
Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120
HARv. L. REV. 528, 552-53 (2006).
184. See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962 (11 th Cir. 1992); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1213 (5th Cir. 1991).
185. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001).
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drawn are properly supported by the research that was performed. Issues arising out of peer review which are likely to come before a court
will usually have to do with proficiency and the honesty of assigned
reviewers. Alternatively, they will attack the attitude of the agency
toward the reviewers' conclusions. Since courts typically lack specific technical or scientific expertise it is usually inappropriate for a
court to directly overturn scientific findings of reviewers. However,
courts can and should examine assertions about the choice of reviewers and definitely ought to examine the agency's treatment of reviewers' reports after the fact.
Notice and Comment procedures rely on a very different logic;
the intent is to allow input from all relevant actors before having the
agency produce an independent decision that takes into account the
arguments of the different parties, but which may or may not be
guided by them.' 86 The goal is to arrive at a decision that can be
justified by analytical reasoning, not necessarily by how much any
party likes it. There is, in fact, an embedded expectation that some
interested party may not like it. Therefore, the agency's interpretation
needs to be measured against an external rational standard. Years of
experimenting with Notice and Comment created a carefully thought
through body of judicial review which developed criteria for evaluating it. These criteria can be summed up as requiring a carefully explained decision, well supported in the materials the agency used,
which takes into consideration the major issues raised by the parties.187 While all those criteria are vague and, like many vague standards, can lead to uncertainty and possible abuse by judges with an
agenda, they make sense as a way to evaluate Notice and Comment. It
is not clear what would be a better way. This means that current "hard
look" review should still be the standard when the agency uses Notice
88
and Comment.
The final model, deliberative participation mechanisms, is established upon yet another basis. Often these mechanisms aim at creating
186. In that sense, Notice and Comment does not really embody the logic of pluralism. Pluralism believes the result of the give and take of interest groups will be the
best possible result; it denies the existence of a solution that is in the "public interest"
independently from the interests of the parties. In that sense, Notice and Commentwhich does expect an agency to provide a justification of its decision that is not just
"this party sent more letters"-is a deliberative, or at least analytical, approach.
187. LUBBERS, supra note 12, at 377-79; Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
188. I personally would support a more deferential standard there-such as Professors McGarity and Shapiro's pass/fail metaphor-but this is not an issue for this paper. THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 260 (1993).
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a decision that is especially suited to the needs and preferences of the
target audience; or a consensual decision; or a legitimate decision. In
other words, a decision that will be acceptable to as many parties as
possible, or at least to informed parties. Allowing an external reviewer to overturn the decision made through such a process because
of its content is problematic. It applies a logic foreign to that of the
participatory process, since it assumes that the external observer can
recognize the best solution better than the participants themselves. It
undermines the legitimacy of the process and creates hostility from the
participants who worked hard to develop a solution-it is worse than
not having the deliberative process at all. Accordingly, evaluation of
deliberative mechanisms should focus on whether the process designed was sufficiently inclusive or participatory given the declared
goals, and whether it was conducted appropriately. In other words,
review should be process based rather than content based. 18 9
This raises the problem of how to evaluate the process-an especially acute problem since there is a debate in the participation literature on how to evaluate participatory processes.' 90 There is not only a
debate about the proper criteria, but many of the mechanisms described above have not been widely used and require quite a bit of
experimentation before we can say what works and what does not.
Accordingly, the process is going to require much effort, and there is
no guarantee of success in any specific process.
Then again, there is no guarantee of success of any specific
rulemaking process, and many run into trouble. Agencies will make
mistakes, and even when they do not, even when they plan the participation process as well as they can given the information they have, the
process will not always work well. No public policy process works
perfectly every time. Rulemaking certainly does not. The goal is to
get to a process that works well enough most of the time. With the
ability to experiment, agencies will gain expertise that will allow them
to do so.
Accordingly, the standard for judicial review of deliberative
mechanisms used should be a "good faith effort" standard. If the
agency made a good faith effort, its process should stand; decisions on
specific situations depend on the process chosen. For example, if an
agency is conducting a community wide discussion and a party asked
189. Which means that in relation to these mechanisms, in the Bazelon-Leventhal
debate, I am taking Bazelon's view. MEIER, supra note 174, 1-3.
190. Webler, supra note 64, at 37-38; Vari, supra note 87, at 103; Renn, supra note
99; MARIAN BARNES, BUILDING A DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: AN EVALUATION OF
Two CIZENS'

JURIES

3-9 (1999).
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to participate and was denied without good reason, there is a problem.
However, if an agency is using a citizen jury and selecting participants
at random, a party can complain about not being allowed to present its
views to the jury, or not having its arguments included in the material,
but it cannot claim one of its members should have been included in
the jury.
D.

Advantages of the Proposed Reform

Any reform carries substantial costs in terms of effort expended
in adjusting to a new system and in dealing with the inevitable unintended consequences. It is always hard to change, especially when the
change is substantial and affects a large system. Therefore, those suggesting reform should have the burden of demonstrating that the costs
associated with their suggested changes are worthwhile. Accordingly,
I offer the following in defense of the reform proposed in this paper.
The most important advantage of the reform would be the improvement, in several ways, of the nature of rulemaking review-and
therefore of accountability of agencies. Fundamentally, it acknowledges lessons from many years of experimenting with different models of participation in rulemaking within the complex administrative
state. It will permit tailoring the mode of participation to the goals to
be achieved. If there is one lesson we have learned from experimenting with participation, it is that cookie cutter models do not work
very well. 19 1 This is especially true in relation to the administrative
state, where agencies vary so much in their activities and nature-as
demonstrated, among other things, by the three rules opening this article.' 92 The question of seatbelts on school busses affects a substantially different audience than do safety conditions in shipyards or
airworthiness of a helicopter. They spark very different levels of controversy, and the nature of the controversy is different; while the
school bus case directly touches on the core values of the majority of
average citizens, the other two cases are much more specialized and
esoteric in nature, and could be expected to elicit comment only from
a narrow segment of the population. The anticipated problems may
also be different. In the case of the seatbelts on school busses, there
are concerns about making a decision that will be inefficient, that will
have more costs than benefits. There is also a concern about making a
191. Though, as will be discussed below, they have advantages of simplicity and
clarity, both for the implementer and for whoever wants to supervise/control them.
192. And for a much broader discussion of the differences among agencies in the
administrative state and substantial anecdotal evidence of them, see Wilson, supra
note 172 at 10-13.
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decision that will divert funds from other goals in a way that makes
calculating costs and benefits very difficult. There are disagreements
about which risk, out of a number of unmeasured risks, is greater.
There is potential for one value, children's safety, to be seen as a
trump card. And there is a concern that the agency will be insensitive
to community concerns, and make a decision that may be analytically
right but politically wrong, i.e., that may have more benefits than costs
but will be seen as damaging. There are powerful legitimacy concerns
there. And the agency can address these through a more participatory
process; NHTSA clearly agrees, since it already scheduled hearings as
part of its the preparatory work before creating a proposed rule, which
would then be subject to the Notice and Comment framework.
The rule addressing safety in shipyards raises a whole different
set of problems. Here, industry is anxious to reduce costs to preserve
its profit; workers may be anxious to have regulations that provide
maximum safety; and the agency, at the end of the day, is aiming to
balance costs and benefits. In this case, it is not focused on consensus,
and not even on diffusing conflict.' 93 It wants to protect workers,
hopefully without crippling the industry. Notice and Comment, in this
situation, possibly augmented with hearings, allows the stakeholders
to express their views and provides the agency with information about
the choices it made (or possibly, if used earlier, about alternatives) and
about preferences. Such a system is probably what the agency needs
in this case.
In relation to the helicopter's airworthiness, the concern is probably about whether the agency's decision makes sense from a technical
point of view: was it correct? While all three cases have technical
elements, in the case of the aircraft it is acknowledged that technical
considerations are paramount. The issue seems to be safety rather
than economic effect. In that situation, peer review would probably be
appropriate.
These are just three examples of rulemakings, all made by government agencies as part of the process of regulating business and
industry, but at the same time differing significantly in many important characteristics. The administrative state makes literally thousands
of such rules every year, and they vary enormously.1 94 It makes sense
to have them reviewed in different ways.

193. Although less conflict may reduce implementation costs.
194. Crews counted 3,595 final rules in 2007 and 3,718 in 2006.
94, at 2.

CREWS,

supra note
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The reform may also improve the quality of decision-making by
giving agencies the room to conduct the review suitable to the type of
decision, rather than superimposing a form of oversight that misses the
point. For example, requiring an agency to go through Notice and
Comment after achieving a rule through deliberative proceedings may
lead a court reviewing the procedures under "hard look" to overturn
the result of the deliberative efforts because of a missed factor-an
analytic requirement that may not fit the purposes of a deliberative
mechanism-and leave the participants frustrated. They will justifiably feel that their substantial efforts in learning the issue and participating in the decision has been brushed aside, and that the decision has
been, in a sense, anti-democratic in ignoring the views of the populace. This will harm the legitimacy of both the agency-which will
seem to have wasted its own resources and the participant's timeand the court, which acted in an anti-populist or anti-participatory
manner. Similarly, requiring answers to comments that are not scientific on an issue that is science-based will not only add useless work
but may lead to changes that are not sufficiently supported to warrant
inclusion.
Use of an issue-tailored oversight procedure may yield other benefits. It may improve the accuracy of rules that are scientifically or
technically-based and which will now be evaluated through expert input by peer review. Another potential advantage of the proposal is
that it may improve accountability by encouraging review earlier in
the process, and allowing such review to count. In addition, the increased openness and honesty in the review process-where agencies
can be clear about when they are using public input and when they are
not-should improve its legitimacy and thus, the legitimacy of the
resulting rule with the public and the stakeholders (sometimes stakeholders will be unhappy, but a better process may increase the legiti95
macy of the rule nonetheless).
IV.
CONCERNS ABOUT THE PROPOSED REFORM

The most powerful concern if the reform is adopted is that under
this reform proposal, the degree of discretion agencies can use is increased. The approach suggested seems to assume a high level of trust
in agencies. The core of this reform is letting agencies decide how
195. See Tyler, supra note 105; E.
CHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,

ALLEN LIND

&

TOM

R.

TYLER, THE SOCIAL

PSY-

57-59 (1988), for evidence that the process mat-

ters to people as much, if not more, than outcomes.
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their decisions will be reviewed. That sounds not only prone to abuse,
but almost to guarantee abuse.
This is a substantial criticism. The institutional structure of the
American government is built on mistrust, with no actor given free
reign. 196 The system is based on limiting government efficiency and
tying government hands to prevent abuse. Agencies in particular have
been everyone's favorite whipping boys for at least twenty years, subject to extensive criticism from politicians and citizens. 197 They were
criticized for being unresponsive bureaucrats; for being captured by
interest groups, especially by those they regulate; for being in the
pocket of politicians; for not reacting to politicians; for being incompetent; for focusing only on expertise and having professional biases;
for discriminating; for not being sensitive to the differences between
cases; for being inflexible; and so on. Why should they be trusted to
competently and honestly design an appropriate review mechanism to
evaluate their own work? This is asking them to prevent their own
98
abuses, something we may trust judges to do, but not bureaucrats.
This could be described as self-regulation at its worst.
I have two responses to this very valid concern; and while they
may appear contradictory, they are both true. First, if agencies are to
be entrusted with extensive delegated roles, as indeed they are, they
must be given discretion in carrying them out. 199 The problem of delegation versus trust is a very real one, but not delegating is not an
option. The same reasons that lead to delegation to agencies-Congress's lack of time and expertise and the desire to remove certain
issues from the political debate 2 0 0-mean that the roles of agencies
196. See, e.g., Dahl, supra note 34, at 6 (repeating this theme throughout the book).
197. See, e.g., McCubbins, supra note 40 (finding that a main issue for Congress is
how to control runaway agencies); ROBERT D.
COUNTABILITY

16-17 (2001);
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Ac-
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(1989); Gregory L. Ogden, Analysis of
Three Current Trends in Administrative Law: Reducing Administrative Delay, Expanding Public Participation,and IncreasingAgency Accountability, 7 PEPP. L. REV.
553, 567-68 (1980) (describing unhappiness with administrative agencies); Norman
L. Jr. Rave, Interagency Conflict and Administrative Accountability: Regulating the
Release of Recombinant Organisms, 77 GEO. L.J., 1787, 1806-09 (1989) (criticizing
agencies for rigidity and "bureaucratic momentum").
198. See Shapiro, supra 35, at 1, 75; GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION:
MUSCLES, PRAYERS, AND OTHER STRATEGIES

LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (Richard A. Brody et al. eds.,
1987); CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY: A PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-

TION POLEMIC 13-14 (4th ed. 2004); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and
the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2095-96 (2004-2005).

199. Edley, supra note 174.
200. See Rubin, supra note 198, at 2092; DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN
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cannot be defined too closely. Congress simply does not have the
time and expertise to decide all the details. At the end of the day, if
agencies cannot be trusted in decision-making, the whole administrative state structure is useless and dangerous. Furthermore, if one of
the roles of agencies is to protect the public from certain dangers,
agencies need to preserve their ability to do so.2 0 ' The anti-adminis20 2
trative impulse is understandable, but has more costs than benefits.
Also, the concerns about agency abuses tend to be overstated. In
practice, agencies seek legitimacy. Lack of legitimacy and suspicion
brings substantial pressures and negative consequences. It leads to
more reporting requirements; to contracting out or putting agency
members on contracts rather than civil service status; to having the
work of years tossed out by a dissatisfied court; to an inability to complete their missions, to do their job well. 20 3 And agencies regularly
face pressures and blame from many actors. 20 4 In an effort to increase
their legitimacy and reduce criticism, agencies already regularly go
beyond the requirements of section 553 of the APA. They go through
pre-rulemaking stages; they conduct oral hearings they are not required to; they use advance notices and deliberative mechanisms and
peer review, as described above. Agencies have an interest in at least
appearing accountable, because they are constantly attacked for lack
of accountability and they know there are real costs to that: political
pressures, budget cuts, and reorganizations.
None of the above should be read to mean that there is no danger
of abuse of power by agencies, or that they should have unfettered,
complete discretion. Unrelated to this reform, agencies are subject to
substantial accountability mechanisms that have nothing to do with the
informal rulemaking process and its complement, the hard look doctrine-both of dubious effect in restraining agencies while allowing
them to do their job. 20 5 Agencies are subject to congressional control
201. See McGarity, supra note 23, at 532 (federal regulatory programs exist to protect the public).
202. See Rubin, supra note 198, at 2091-98.
203. See, e.g., ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LAW 25-29 (2001) (telling the story of the negative effects of too much accountability
on Oakland's port).
204. MELVIN J. DUBNICK & BARBARA S. ROMZEK, AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: POLITICS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EXPEcTATIONS 62-72 (1991); WILLIAM T.
GORMLEY JR. & STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE (2004); BERYL A. RADIN, THE ACCOUNTABLE JUGGLER 1-2

(2002).
205. WILSON, supra note 172, at 235-36; Wood & Waterman, supra note 145, at
129-32; Scott Furlong, supra note 173, at 48-49; KEvIN B. SMITH AND MICHAEL J.
LICARI, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: POWER AND POLITICS IN THE FOURTH BRANCH OF
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both through legislation and the appropriation process; both have their
limitations as effective accountability mechanisms, but when Congress really wants to use them, it does. 20 6 Agencies are subject to a
host of control mechanisms in the hands of the President, from removal powers for executive agencies through presidential review and
executive orders to informal influence. 20 7 And they are subject to political and media pressures. These mechanisms would still be in place.
Furthermore, as explained in the previous sections, the reform
does not reduce accountability of agencies. First, agencies must still
have a review process. So an accountability mechanism is put in place
for each rulemaking. Since it will be better tailored to the rule, it may
lead to more meaningful review of the process. Second, the process is
subject to judicial review. If agencies attempt to rig the peer review
process, or choose an unsuitable mechanism, they can and will be
taken before a court and have to justify their choices. If appropriate,
those choices will be overturned. Therefore, the reform does not seem
to require a much greater level of trust in agencies than the current
system. It does not present opportunities for abuse beyond those in
existence today. In fact, it should produce closer review by providing
for increased participation in appropriate cases; the matching of format to the type of issue ought to make the review better targeted and
more to the point.
Another concern is the ability of the courts to review the choices
agencies make as to participation. It is true the reform would require
courts to gain more expertise in relation to public participation mechanisms and learn what has been used and what is appropriate in various
circumstances; however, as things stand now, judges dealing with administrative cases regularly find themselves required to address complex issues which confront them. Under the reformed process, they
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William G. Howell, The PresidentialPower of UnilateralAction, 15 J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 132 (1999); Steven P. Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An
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will have to gain expertise in one field: mechanisms of participation, a
field that is probably more accessible to lay persons than nuclear physics. Some of the expertise needed for the review they will be doing
under this process is much closer to the training provided to legal professionals than that needed to review most administrative decisions.
Participation is also only one field, as opposed to the endless areas of
expertise included in the administrative state. Thus, their chances of
gaining expertise that will allow them to meaningfully review agency
decisions are improved, not reduced.
Another important cause of concern is the fact that adding alternatives to the system will make it more complex and less uniform. Of
course, the current APA system does not stand on its own; many
agency statutes deviate from it or add to it, and the reality of administrative rulemaking is already very complex. However, the proposed
reform does create a less uniform mechanism than current rulemaking
procedures. In this, it is less elegant and less easy than the reform
suggested by Fontana. The price of a system that is more nuanced and
better tailored to specific cases is less clarity in rules and less simplicity of procedure. It is certainly a trade-off. I think it is a worthwhile
one.
CONCLUSION

The APA was written in 1946, though it has since been updated.
In the 1960s and 1970s, judges increased the level of their review of
agencies behavior and bureaucracies started experimenting with
rulemaking and mechanisms of participation in response to accusations of agency capture and abuse.2 0 8 But we have been living with
distrust of agencies and a desire for public participation for several
decades, giving us a chance to experiment and learn about new ways
to participate, and to learn, also, that participation is not an automatic
cure for every ill. It is time to put the knowledge we have gained into
practice, by creating a mechanism to tailor participation to the goals to
be achieved by it: peer review if the rulemaking involves only applying expertise; Notice and Comment when the goal is to inform and
receive information; and deliberative mechanisms when the goal is to
achieve consensus and facilitate implementation.
This change fits the practices of many agencies that have been
experimenting with more extensive participation. It should increase
legitimacy by eliminating participation which is merely proforma and

208. Schiller, supra note 11, at 1154; Stewart, supra note 35, at 1713.
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instead reserve participation for instances where it is really meaningful. It will also fundamentally alter the nature of judicial review.
Many scholars would say it is about time.
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